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ARTICLES
THE SUPREME COURT’S
ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE
Richard Moberly†
ABSTRACT
In five cases issued during the last five years, the Supreme Court
interpreted statutory antiretaliation provisions broadly to protect
employees who report illegal employer conduct. These decisions
conflict with the common understanding of the Court as pro-employer
and judicially conservative. In a sixth retaliation decision during this
time, however, the Court interpreted constitutional antiretaliation
protection narrowly; an act that fits with the Court’s pro-employer
image but diverges from the antiretaliation stance it appeared to take
in the other five retaliation cases. This Article explains these
seemingly anomalous results by examining the last fifty years of the
Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. In doing so, a persistent
theme emerges: the “Antiretaliation Principle.” This Principle
advances the notion that protecting employees from retaliation will
enhance the enforcement of the nation’s laws. Interestingly, although
the Court has used the Antiretaliation Principle for a half-century to
strengthen statutory protections against employer retaliation, it also
has demonstrated consistently that it considers the Antiretaliation
Principle primarily a statutory, rather than constitutional, norm.
The Antiretaliation Principle explains the Court’s recent cases and
provides a reasoned and consistent standard against which they can
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be evaluated. Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation
Principle provides important lessons for lower courts as they confront
the need to protect whistleblowing employees from employer
retaliation.
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INTRODUCTION
In each of five recent cases involving statutory-based employee
retaliation claims, the Supreme Court has upheld the employee’s
claim and expanded protections against employer retaliation.1 A sixth
employment retaliation case, however, which was based on an alleged
violation of an employee’s First Amendment rights, reached a
dramatically different result. In Garcetti v. Ceballos,2 the Court found
in favor of the employer and severely restricted constitutional
antiretaliation protection.3
1 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846,
852–53 (2009) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); CBOCS W., Inc. v.
Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1961 (2008) (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v.
Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1943 (2008) (interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 56–57 (2006) (interpreting
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167,
171 (2005) (interpreting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
2 547 U.S. 410 (2006).
3 See id. at 426 (holding that the First Amendment did not protect government employees
who speak about matters of public concern if the employee’s statements were made pursuant to
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Together these cases present a confusing and seemingly
contradictory view of the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence. On the
one hand, the Court’s holdings in the five statutory cases could
indicate that the Court favors employees in retaliation cases—a
conclusion that would strike many commentators as odd given the
Court’s decidedly mixed record of protecting employee rights over
the past decade.4 On the other hand, the Court’s Garcetti opinion
significantly narrowed government employees’ protection when they
blow the whistle on employer misconduct,5 perhaps indicating a
deeper resistance to retaliation protection. Moreover, as explained in
more detail below, taken together, the Court’s opinions appear
untethered to any consistent judicial philosophy, often confounding
commentators.6
This Article attempts to bring consistency and cohesion to this
morass by placing these recent retaliation cases in the context of a
half-century of Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence. This process
illuminates the Court’s underlying rationale in retaliation cases
generally, which I label the “Antiretaliation Principle.” The
Antiretaliation Principle differs from other justifications for
retaliation protection because it focuses on the notion that protecting
employees from retaliation will enhance the enforcement of the

his professional duties).
4 See, e.g., Melissa Hart, Procedural Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008–2009 Labor
and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 283–84 (2009) (noting that the
Roberts Court has issued several decisions undercutting an employee’s ability to bring
employment discrimination claims in federal court); Scott A. Moss, Fighting Discrimination
While Fighting Litigation: A Tale of Two Supreme Courts, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 981, 983
(2007) (“In employment discrimination, it is as if there are two Supreme Courts issuing
conflicting rulings.”); Anita Silvers et al., Disability and Employment Discrimination at the
Rehnquist Court, 75 MISS. L.J. 945, 946 (2006) (“[T]he Rehnquist Court[ had a] general pattern
of favoring plaintiffs in race and sex-based employment discrimination cases, while being
decidedly pro-defendant in the parallel context of disability-related claims.”); Jonathan R.
Harkavy, Supreme Court of the United States Employment Law Commentary 2007 Term, at 2
(Oct. 12, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=1282160 (noting that although employees “won” more cases than they lost in
2007, there was no “discernable shift in the Court’s orientation as an employer-friendly
forum”); Marcia Coyle, Term’s Five Key Bias Decisions Were Mixed, NAT’L L.J. (July 6, 2009),
http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202431973694&Terms_five_key_bias_deci
sions_were_mixed_&slreturn=1 (quoting Professor Paul Secunda’s statement that “[t]his Court
tilts substantially towards pro-employer interests” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As
Professor Scott Moss has noted, even though the Court has issued some rulings protecting
employees in discrimination cases, the Court’s “anti-litigation” policies “significantly harm” the
Court’s commitment to fighting discrimination. Moss, supra, at 986; see also Harkavy, supra, at
37 (“[T]he unspoken, yet unmistakably apparent, agenda of the new majority is enhancement of
employer prerogatives, recently focusing on protection of the at-will doctrine.”).
5 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 426 (“We reject . . . the notion that the First Amendment
shields from discipline the expressions employees make pursuant to their professional duties.”).
6 See discussion infra Part II.C.
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nation’s laws.7 Moreover, it both explains the recent Supreme Court
cases and provides a reasoned and consistent standard against which
they can be evaluated. Importantly, the Court’s use of the Principle
also offers guidance for the way courts ought to approach the issue of
employer retaliation in the future.
Part I of the Article demonstrates that the Supreme Court
historically has approached retaliation cases differently than typical
employment matters. In employment cases, the Court often balances
the employer’s interests against the employee’s interests.8 In
retaliation cases, however, the Supreme Court uses the Antiretaliation
Principle to also consider society’s interest in effective enforcement
of the laws—an interest the Court believes can be advanced through
strong antiretaliation protection for employees.9 For the past fifty
years, the Court applied this Principle consistently in statutory
7 Commentators have provided numerous other rationales for antiretaliation protection.
See, e.g., Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1405, 1434–35 (1967) (arguing
that courts should adopt a tort of “abusive discharge” based on a fairness principle that
employees are economically dependent on employers); Deborah L. Brake, Retaliation, 90
MINN. L. REV. 18, 21–22 (2005) (asserting that retaliation protection is another form of statutory
prohibition on discrimination); Richard R. Carlson, Citizen Employees, 70 LA. L. REV. 237,
245–46 (2009) (arguing that retaliation protection should be provided to “citizen employees”
who act in the public interest); Stewart J. Schwab, Wrongful Discharge Law and the Search for
Third-Party Effects, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1943, 1945 (1996) (“[T]he search for third-party effects is
the driving force behind the tort [of wrongful discharge].”); ROBERT G. VAUGHN, HOW
DIFFERING PERCEPTIONS OF WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION INFLUENCE THE CHARACTER OF
LEGAL STANDARDS (2006), www.corrupcion.unam.mx/documentos/ponencias/C_Vaughn.pdf
(describing four separate justifications for protecting whistleblowers).
8 See, e.g., Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2152 (2008) (noting that a
“main principle” in the Court’s public employment cases is that “although government
employees do not lose their constitutional rights when they accept their positions, those rights
must be balanced against the realities of the employment context”); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 793–809 (1998) (balancing various employer and employee interests in
creating vicarious liability rules for supervisors under Title VII, but also providing for employer
affirmative defenses); UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206–07 (1991) (narrowly
interpreting Title VII’s bona fide occupational qualification defense using a test that balances
only an employee’s rights against an employer’s business needs, and finding that the interests of
a pregnant worker’s unborn children are not business needs); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting that Title VII strikes a “delicate balance between
employee and employer rights”); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989)
(plurality opinion) (discussing Title VII’s “balance between employee rights and employer
prerogatives”); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 719–20 (1987) (“In the case of searches
conducted by a public employer, we must balance the invasion of the employees’ legitimate
expectations of privacy against the government’s need for supervision, control, and the efficient
operation of the workplace.”); Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 797–98 (1945)
(approving the NLRB’s balance “between the undisputed right of self-organization assured to
employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain
discipline in their establishments”); cf. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(b)(5)(A),
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (balancing reasonable accommodation of an employee’s
disability against any undue hardship to the employer).
9 See discussion infra Part I.
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retaliation cases, but taken a slightly more cautious approach in First
Amendment cases.
Prior to this Article, the Supreme Court’s extensive case law
regarding retaliation had never been examined through the organizing
lens of the Antiretaliation Principle. Rather, commentators often
examine these cases in isolation, through principles developed for the
specific statute or constitutional provision under which the retaliation
claim arose. For example, commentators examine retaliation cases as
involving discrete subject matters such as discrimination,10 the First
Amendment,11 or preemption.12 Part I of the Article steps back from
the “trees” of individual substantive issues and explains the “forest”
of retaliation cases.
Part II examines how the Court relied on the Antiretaliation
Principle, both explicitly and implicitly, in the six recent retaliation
cases. Ultimately, the Principle explains the Court’s current
retaliation jurisprudence and provides a principled way to evaluate the
Court’s decisions: do these decisions advance the Court’s own
Antiretaliation Principle by enhancing the enforcement of law? As
this Part explains, in the recent statutory cases, the Court furthered the
Antiretaliation Principle by privileging it over other norms that many
would have thought sacrosanct to this Court. By contrast, although
the lone constitutional case explicitly references the Antiretaliation
Principle, the rule adopted by the Court in Garcetti likely will
undermine society’s interest in law enforcement.
Identifying and explaining the Court’s reliance on the
Antiretaliation Principle has significant ramifications for the future of
retaliation law, which I discuss in Part III. First, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari in two cases for the 2010–11 Term that will test the
boundaries of the Antiretaliation Principle. In Kasten v. Saint-Gobain
Performance Plastics Corp.,13 the Court will examine whether the
Fair Labor Standards Act’s antiretaliation provision protects
employees who file oral as well as written complaints.14 Furthermore,

10 See, e.g., Brake, supra note 7, at 21–22 (examining retaliation as a part of
discrimination law).
11 See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U.
COLO. L. REV. 1101, 1102–07 (2008) (examining First Amendment protection for federal
employees).
12 See, e.g., Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort Remedies for Wrongful Discharge
in the Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextricably Intertwined?, 34 S.D.
L. REV. 63, 89–98 (1989) (examining the Supreme Court’s analysis of federal preemption of
state wrongful-discharge claims under the Labor Management Relations Act).
13 570 F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010).
14 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
No. 09-834 (Jan. 12, 2010), 2010 WL 146471.
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Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP15 presents the issue of
whether Title VII’s antiretaliation provision prohibits an employer
from retaliating against a third party who is associated with an
employee who engaged in protected conduct.16 The Court could use
the Antiretaliation Principle to broaden antiretaliation protections
under these statutes, despite arguments that the statutory language at
issue in each case seemingly excludes the employees’ claims.17
Second, respecting the Court’s view of the Antiretaliation
Principle should cause lower courts to evaluate retaliation cases
through this same lens. This perspective might impact a number of
retaliation issues currently percolating. For example, courts have been
struggling with the level of causation required by various retaliation
statutes,18 and the Antiretaliation Principle can help provide some
guidance on this complicated issue.19 Further, a focus on law
enforcement would help courts interpret when a whistleblowing
employee has a “reasonable belief” that an employer has violated the
law, an issue that lower courts often have used to undermine statutory
protection from retaliation.20
I. THE PAST: THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE
During the last fifty years of its retaliation jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has recognized that employees must be protected from
retaliation in order to further the enforcement of society’s civil and
criminal laws. This “Antiretaliation Principle” allows the Court to
examine antiretaliation protection as a law-enforcement tool that
benefits society, rather than simply as extra protection for employees
provided at a cost to employers. The Court makes three assumptions
throughout its opinions to support the Principle: (1) employees are in
the best position to know about illegal conduct by their employer or
other employees; (2) employees will report this information if the law
protects them from employer retaliation; and (3) employee reports
about misconduct will improve law enforcement.

567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010).
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, No. 09-291
(Sept. 3, 2009), 2010 WL 3501186.
17 See discussion infra Part III.A.
18 See discussion infra Part III.B.
19 A recent nonretaliation Supreme Court case, Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 129
S. Ct. 2343 (2009), which dealt with the appropriate level of causation under the discrimination
provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, will complicate this struggle. See id. at
2350 (“To establish a disparate-treatment claim under the plain language of the ADEA . . . a
plaintiff must prove that age was the ‘but-for’ cause of the employer’s adverse decision.”).
20 See discussion infra Part III.B.
15
16
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Significantly, the Court has applied the Principle in statutory cases
differently than it has in First Amendment retaliation cases. In
statutory cases, the Court broadly interpreted explicit antiretaliation
provisions and implied antiretaliation protections even when no
specific provision existed. The Court’s First Amendment retaliation
jurisprudence, however, provides an outer limit of the Principle.
Although the Court recognized the Antiretaliation Principle’s
importance in these cases, the Court also suggested that statutes,
rather than the Constitution, might be the better source for
antiretaliation protection.
A. Statutory Protection
Professor Clyde Summers once noted that labor law’s purpose has
always been to address the imbalance in bargaining power between
employees and employers.21 From this perspective, statutory and
judicial employment protections exist to protect employees’
“primarily non-economic interests in fairness, personal dignity,
privacy, and physical integrity.”22 These legal protections must be
balanced against the employer’s countervailing interest in the
flexibility and efficiency provided by the at-will-employment rule.23
In nonretaliation labor-and-employment cases, the Supreme Court has
recognized this balancing of legal protection for employees against
the economic burden that protection places on employers.24
Particularly in recent years, however, that balance seems to be
weighted towards employer interests in many nonretaliation
decisions.25
21 Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67
NEB. L. REV. 7, 7 (1988).
22 Id. at 15.
23 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 102(b)(5)(A), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (2006) (balancing reasonable accommodation of an employee’s disability
against any undue hardship to the employer); Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at
Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 951–69 (1984) (describing the efficiency of the at-willemployment rule).
24 See, e.g., Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 182 n.4 (1989) (noting that
Title VII strikes a “delicate balance between employee and employer rights”); Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989) (plurality opinion) (discussing how Title VII balances
“employee rights and employer prerogatives” by eliminating “certain bases for distinguishing
among employees while otherwise preserving employers’ freedom of choice”); see also supra
note 8 (citing cases that discuss Title VII balancing).
25 See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664–65 (2009) (prohibiting employers
from engaging in affirmative action in most circumstances, even if the affirmative-action
policies were promulgated to avoid disparate-impact lawsuits); Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2352 (2009) (requiring that plaintiffs who bring disparate-treatment claims
under the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, but-for causation); Engquist
v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2156–57 (2008) (limiting the ability of public
employees to invoke the Equal Protection Clause in certain employment discrimination claims);
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By contrast, the Court’s use of the Antiretaliation Principle in
statutory retaliation cases typically has led to enhanced employee
protection as compared to other types of employment-law cases. In
these retaliation cases, the Court often utilized the Antiretaliation
Principle’s “law enforcement” perspective to weigh a third interest:
the interest of society in having the law enforced. As described below,
the Court placed great weight on this societal interest because, in the
Court’s formulation, protecting employees from retaliation increases
employees’ willingness to provide information about illegal activity,
which in turn advances societal law-enforcement goals.
Several cases that demonstrate the Court’s use of the
Antiretaliation Principle involved statutes lacking explicit legislative
history regarding the purpose of antiretaliation legislation. This
legislative silence often required the Supreme Court to explicate this
purpose by utilizing the Antiretaliation Principle to justify a broad
reading of a statutory antiretaliation provision.26 For example, in the
Court’s first modern case involving a statutory antiretaliation
provision, Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc.,27 the Court
examined section 17 of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of

Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2175–78 (2007) (limiting the statute
of limitations for Title VII discrimination cases), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) (“The
limitation imposed by the Court [in Ledbetter] on the filing of discriminatory compensation
claims ignores the reality of wage discrimination and is at odds with the robust application of
the civil rights laws that Congress intended.”).
26 The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) is the rare exception, and even that
legislative history is sparse. Congress included an antiretaliation provision in the NLRA, one of
the first employment statutes it enacted, to protect employees who had “filed charges or given
testimony” related to a violation of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006); see also STEPHEN
M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW 93 (2001) (“Among the
oldest statutes that protect employees (and supervisors) who engage in protected conduct, which
under some circumstances can be classified as whistleblowing, is the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA).” (footnote omitted)). Congress adopted this antiretaliation language from an
earlier executive order issued under a predecessor statute explicitly so that employees would
feel free to file charges when an employer violated the NLRA’s substantive provisions. See 79
CONG. REC. S7676 (1935) (statement of Sen. Robert Wagner) (noting that without an NLRA
antiretaliation provision “even though there might be flagrant violations of the provisions of this
measure, an employee would not be free to file charges. He would know that the moment the
charges were filed he would be discharged.”); Matthew W. Finkin, Commentary, Labor Law by
Boz—A Theory of Meyers Industries, Inc., Sears, Roebuck and Co., and Bird Engineering, 71
IOWA L. REV. 155, 171 (1985) (noting that Congress relied on Executive Order 6711 when it
adopted “the antiretaliation provision in the enumeration of unfair labor practices under the
[NLRA]”).
27 361 U.S. 288 (1960). Twenty-three years before Robert DeMario Jewelry, the Supreme
Court upheld a provision of the NLRA that prevented another form of retaliation. In NLRB v.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33–34 (1937), the Court upheld section 8 of the
NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1934), which prohibits employers from engaging in unfair labor
practices, such as interfering with employees who exercise their NLRA rights and
discriminating against employees to discourage union membership.
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1938.28 This provision explicitly gave federal courts jurisdiction to
enjoin violations of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision, but the case
presented the question of whether the provision also permitted courts
to order that an employer pay damages to employees who were
retaliated against in violation of the Act.29 Although the FLSA
seemed to limit courts’ powers to only injunctive relief,30 the
Supreme Court held that the judiciary’s implicit, equitable powers in
injunction cases included the power “to provide complete relief in the
light of the statutory purposes,” including awarding back pay
damages.31 The Court based its holding explicitly on the
Antiretaliation Principle:
[Congress] chose to rely on information and complaints
received from employees seeking to vindicate rights claimed
to have been denied. Plainly, effective enforcement could thus
only be expected if employees felt free to approach officials
with their grievances. This end the prohibition of § 15(a)(3)
against discharges and other discriminatory practices was
designed to serve. For it needs no argument to show that fear
of economic retaliation might often operate to induce
aggrieved employees quietly to accept substandard
conditions. By the proscription of retaliatory acts set forth in
§ 15(a)(3), and its enforcement in equity by the Secretary
pursuant to § 17, Congress sought to foster a climate in which
compliance with the substantive provisions of the Act would
be enhanced.
In this context, the significance of reimbursement of lost wages
becomes apparent. To an employee considering an attempt to secure
his just wage deserts [sic] under the Act, the value of such an effort
may pale when set against the prospect of discharge and the total loss
of wages for the indeterminate period necessary to seek and obtain
reinstatement. Resort to statutory remedies might thus often take on
the character of a calculated risk, with restitution of partial
deficiencies in wages due for past work perhaps obtainable only at the
cost of irremediable entire loss of pay for an unpredictable period.
29 U.S.C. § 217 (1958).
Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. at 289.
30 See 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1952) (giving the district courts jurisdiction, “for cause shown,” to
restrain violations of the FLSA’s antiretaliation provision, provided that “no court shall have
jurisdiction, in any action brought by the Secretary of Labor to restrain such violations, to order
the payment to employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an
additional equal amount as liquidated damages in such action”).
31 Robert DeMario Jewelry, 361 U.S. at 292.
28
29

2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM

384

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2

Faced with such alternatives, employees understandably might decide
that matters had best be left as they are. We cannot read the Act as
presenting those it sought to protect with what is little more than a
Hobson’s choice.32
Thus, in Robert DeMario Jewlery, the Court broadly interpreted a
statutory antiretaliation provision because it recognized that
employees needed strong remedies to encourage them to come
forward with information about violations of the law. Moreover, the
Court asserted that Congress specifically intended for employee
information to play a role in the statute’s enforcement scheme.
After Robert DeMario Jewelry, the Court consistently wove
language supporting the Antiretaliation Principle into its
interpretations of statutory antiretaliation protections. In NLRB v.
Scrivener,33 the first Supreme Court case to use the term “retaliatory
discharge,”34 the Court found that the National Labor Relations Act
protected employees who gave sworn statements to a National Labor
Relations Board field examiner, even though the part of the Act’s
antiretaliation provision at issue seemed to limit its protections to
employees who file formal charges or testify at a formal hearing. 35
Limiting the statute’s protections to a narrow reading of the
provision’s text, according to the Court, would undermine the Act’s
purpose of encouraging “all persons with information about [unfair
labor] practices to be completely free from coercion against reporting
them to the Board.”36 Employees need “complete freedom” to report
in order “to prevent the Board’s channels of information from being
dried up by employer intimidation of prospective complainants and
witnesses.”37 Yet again, the Court acknowledged the important role of
employee information in enforcing the law.
Scrivener began a series of cases in which the Court found that
express antiretaliation statutory provisions should be interpreted
Id. at 292–93 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
405 U.S. 117 (1972).
34 See Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 408 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook,
C.J., dissenting in part) (citing Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117).
35 Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 125 (“We therefore conclude that an employer’s discharge of an
employee because the employee gave a written sworn statement to a Board field examiner
investigating an unfair labor practice charge filed against the employer constitutes a violation of
§ 8(a)(4) of the National Labor Relations Act.”). In Scrivener, the Court interpreted section
8(a)(4) of the NLRA, which provides that an employer may not “discharge or otherwise
discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under this
[Act].” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006).
36 Scrivener, 405 U.S. at 121 (quoting Nash v. Fla. Indus. Comm’n, 389 U.S. 235, 238
(1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
37 Id. at 122 (quoting John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. NLRB, 191 F.2d 483, 485 (D.C.
Cir. 1951)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
32
33
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broadly to support the Antiretaliation Principle.38 For example, in
Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc.,39 the Court recognized the
importance of employee reports to detect illegal safety violations in
the transportation industry40 and upheld a statutory scheme that
permitted an administrative agency to temporarily reinstate a fired
whistleblower because “the eventual recovery of backpay may not
alone provide sufficient protection to encourage reports of safety
violations.”41 Mirroring the “Hobson’s choice” language from Robert
DeMario Jewelry,42 the Roadway Express Court accepted Congress’
rationale for the whistleblower protections:
Section 405 was enacted in 1983 to encourage employee
reporting of noncompliance with safety regulations governing
commercial motor vehicles. Congress recognized that
employees in the transportation industry are often best able
to detect safety violations and yet, because they may be
threatened with discharge for cooperating with enforcement
agencies, they need express protection against retaliation for
reporting these violations. . . .
Congress also recognized that the employee’s protection
against having to choose between operating an unsafe vehicle
and losing his job would lack practical effectiveness if the
employee could not be reinstated pending complete review.
The longer a discharged employee remains unemployed, the
more devastating are the consequences to his personal
financial condition and prospects for reemployment. Ensuring
the eventual recovery of backpay may not alone provide
sufficient protection to encourage reports of safety violations.
Accordingly, § 405 incorporates additional protections,
authorizing temporary reinstatement based on a preliminary
finding of reasonable cause to believe that the employee has
suffered a retaliatory discharge.43
Similarly, the Court paid particularly close attention to the role
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision plays in enforcing that law and
advancing the Act’s goals, even though Title VII’s legislative history
38 See id. (“[Section 8(a)(4)] can also be read more broadly. . . . This broad interpretation
of § 8(a)(4) accords with the Labor Board’s view entertained for more than 35 years.”).
39 481 U.S. 252 (1987).
40 Id. at 258.
41 Id. at 259.
42 Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1959).
43 Roadway Express, 481 U.S. at 258–59 (emphasis added).
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contains little insight into the purposes of its antiretaliation provision.
The primary purpose of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision,
according to the Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.,44 is to help
enforce the law by “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms.”45 In Robinson, the Court examined whether
Title VII protected former employees from retaliation.46 The Court
admitted that, “at first blush,” Title VII’s plain statutory language
excluded former employees from protection because it applies only to
“employees,” which “would seem to refer to those having an existing
employment relationship with the employer in question.”47 Yet, after
scrutinizing the term in other parts of Title VII, the Court determined
that its meaning was “ambiguous.”48 To resolve this ambiguity, the
Court relied on the Antiretaliation Principle, holding that former
employees should be protected from retaliation because the Court did
not want to “undermine the effectiveness of Title VII by allowing the
threat of postemployment retaliation to deter victims of
discrimination from complaining to the EEOC.”49
The Court also applied the Antiretaliation Principle by permitting a
statutory retaliation claim to proceed even though the statute at issue
did not contain any antiretaliation language. In Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, Inc.,50 the Court held that a statutory antidiscrimination
provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1982, contained an implied cause of action for
retaliation.51 Section 1982 still provides that “[a]ll citizens of the
United States shall have the same right . . . as is enjoyed by white
citizens . . . to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and
personal property.”52 Despite the clear absence of any explicit
protection from retaliation in the statutory language, the Sullivan
Court upheld a retaliation claim by a white landowner who was
retaliated against for leasing a house to a black man.53 The Court
concluded that, if an individual could be “punished for trying to
vindicate the rights of minorities protected by § 1982,” then “[s]uch a
519 U.S. 337 (1997).
Id. at 346.
46 Id.
47 Id. at 341.
48 Id. at 343–44 (“Once it is established that the term ‘employees’ includes former
employees in some sections, but not in others, the term standing alone is necessarily ambiguous
and each section must be analyzed to determine whether the context gives the term a further
meaning that would resolve the issue in dispute.”).
49 Id. at 346.
50 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
51 Id. at 237 (“A narrow construction of language of § 1982 would be quite inconsistent
with the broad and sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded by § 1 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, from which § 1982 was derived.”).
52 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2006).
53 See Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 234–35, 237.
44
45
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sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions
on property.”54 In other words, the Court found that enforcing § 1982
meant providing additional protection from retaliation, even if the
statute itself did not contain any explicit antiretaliation protection.
The outcomes of retaliation cases also demonstrate the Court’s
recognition of the Antiretaliation Principle’s importance, as much as
the opinions’ language, particularly in statutory cases. For example,
during the last fifty years, the Court interpreted statutes to allow a
broad range of individuals to bring retaliation claims, including third
parties who report statutory violations,55 former employees,56 at-will
employees,57 elected union officials against their union,58 and illegal
aliens.59 Moreover, the Court indicated that these statutes provide a
wide range of remedies60 to victims of a wide range of retaliatory
actions by employers.61 Significantly, the Court also recognized the
importance of state retaliation remedies by not permitting federal
statutory schemes with weak retaliation remedies to impliedly
preempt potentially stronger state tort claims based on an employer’s
retaliation.62
Id. at 237.
See id. (holding that a third party enjoyed retaliation protection when reporting 42
U.S.C. § 1982 violations).
56 See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (holding that former
employees were protected under Title VII’s antiretaliation provision).
57 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125–27 (1998) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1985(2), which prevents “intimidation or retaliation against witnesses in federal-court
proceedings,” includes protection for at-will employees).
58 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (interpreting
the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959).
59 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895–96 (1984) (holding that an employer’s
reporting of undocumented alien employees to law enforcement authorities was an unfair labor
practice under the National Labor Relations Act when done in retaliation for the employees’
participation in union activities).
60 See Brock v. Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1987) (approving the
Department of Labor’s decision to order temporary reinstatement with backpay as a remedy for
retaliation); Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 296 (1960) (finding that
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 gave courts the power to award backpay damages in
addition to ordering injunctive relief). But see Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 902–05 (restricting the
backpay and reinstatement remedies for illegal aliens).
61 See Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (holding that
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision applies outside of the workplace and prohibits any employer
action that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination”); Haddle, 525 U.S. at 125–27 (prohibiting employers from firing at-will
employees in retaliation for their testifying in federal proceedings); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v.
NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744 (1983) (allowing courts to enjoin employers from prosecuting
“baseless” lawsuits that are designed to retaliate against employees who are exercising their
rights under the National Labor Relations Act).
62 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994) (holding that the
Railway Labor Act does not preempt state wrongful-discharge torts); English v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (holding that section 210(a) of the Energy Reorganization Act does not
preempt an employee’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim); Lingle v. Norge Div.
54
55
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A few counterexamples exist in which the Court did not recognize
the Antiretaliation Principle and its primary goal of protecting
society’s interest in law enforcement. Instead, the Court utilized its
typical “employment law” focus and concentrated only on balancing
the interests of employers and employees. Clark County School
District v. Breeden63 presents an example of this type of case. In
Breeden, the plaintiff alleged that she had been retaliated against for
complaining about alleged sexual harassment and for filing a lawsuit
based on that complaint.64 In the case’s primary holding, the Supreme
Court found in favor of the employer because the plaintiff did not
engage in protected activity.65 According to the Court, “no reasonable
person” could have believed that the alleged sexual harassment about
which the plaintiff complained violated Title VII because the conduct
in question was a single instance of behavior that could not have
violated the law.66 After Breeden, courts consistently adopted the
standard that an employee must have a “reasonable belief” in the
illegality of an employer’s action in order to be protected from
retaliation.67
As applied by the Court in Breeden, this standard may not fully
advance the goals of the Antiretaliation Principle. Indeed, the Breeden
Court never mentioned the importance of retaliation protection for
enforcing Title VII. Instead, the Court cited almost exclusively to its
sexual-harassment jurisprudence to demonstrate that the activity
about which the plaintiff complained could not be considered sexual
harassment, because it was a single incident that was not “extremely

of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 412–13 (1988) (holding that section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 did not preempt an employee’s state tort remedy for
wrongful discharge). But see Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990)
(holding that section 514(a) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 expressly
preempted employees’ state common-law claims of wrongful discharge).
63 532 U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam).
64 Id. at 269–70.
65 Id. at 270–73.
66 Id. at 271. The Court also found that the plaintiff could not prove causation—that any
protected activity caused an adverse employment action. Id. at 272–73. In doing so, the Court
relied exclusively on various factual showings regarding the timing of the alleged protected
activity and the adverse action. The Court did not discuss, or even mention, the appropriate legal
standard for causation in a retaliation case, nor did the Court attempt to explain any policy
rationale for its decision. Id.
67 See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, To Report or Not to Report: The Case for Eliminating the
Objectively Reasonable Requirement for Opposition Activities Under Title VII’s AntiRetaliation Provision, 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1127, 1129 n.7 (2007) (stating that after Breeden, all of
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals have adopted the objectively reasonable standard when
adjudicating Title VII antiretaliation cases). Courts also use the “reasonable belief” standard for
other statutes, such as Title IX and Title VI, even though the origin of the objectively reasonable
standard is rooted in Title VII’s unique statutory language. See Brake, supra note 7, at 83.
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serious.”68 This sexual-harassment jurisprudence requires “severe or
pervasive” employer action that alters the terms and conditions of
employment,69 a standard derived from the Court’s previous
balancing of employer and employee interests.70 Unlike the other
retaliation cases mentioned above, the Breeden Court never discussed
whether its holding would promote better compliance with the law.71
To be fair, though, the “reasonable belief” standard adopted by the
Court seems more generous to employees than requiring the
employee to report an actual illegality. This alternate course is
supported by Title VII’s language, which provides protection only if
an employee opposes employment practices that are “made an
unlawful employment practice by [Title VII.]”72 In other words, the
Court could have justified a standard requiring the reporting
employee to prove actual employer illegality, instead of only a
reasonable belief that the employer’s conduct was illegal.73 Moreover,
several “employee friendly” retaliation statutes have explicitly
adopted the “reasonable belief” standard articulated in Breeden, and
many would consider that to be a sensible requirement for protection
from retaliation, assuming the standard is appropriately applied.74 In
Breeden, however, the Court adopted this standard without examining
68 See Breeden, 532 U.S. at 270–71 (citing Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786
(1998)); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998); Oncale v. Sundowner
Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23
(1993); Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986)).
69 See, e.g., Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 67.
70 See, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 793–808 (balancing various employer and employee
interests to create a rule that makes an employer vicariously liable for a supervisor’s actionable
discrimination, while still providing the employer with affirmative defenses); Onacle, 523 U.S.
at 82 (asserting that same-sex sexual-harassment claims would not eviscerate Title VII because
“[c]ommon sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable courts and juries
to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among members of the same sex, and
conduct which a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or
abusive”); Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (noting that the Court’s Title VII sexual-harassment standard
“takes a middle path”).
71 Breeden likely does not represent a serious deviation from the Antiretaliation Principle.
One group of commentators believe that Breeden “may simply be a case of unsympathetic
plaintiffs making ‘bad law,’” rather than a “signal [of] the Supreme Court’s hostility to
retaliation cases in general.” MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW 160 (3d ed.
2005).
72 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); see also Rosenthal,
supra note 67, at 1133 (“[T]he statutory language indicates that the activity the employee
opposes must violate Title VII . . . .”).
73 See, e.g., EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F. Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975)
(requiring the plaintiff to show that the employer had engaged in an unlawful act under Title
VII); Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1140–41 (“[T]he Court’s language [in Breeden] suggested
that perhaps it would require an actual [Title VII] violation, as the statute’s language requires.”).
74 See, e.g., Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 § 219, 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 2087(a)(1) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(a)(1) (2006); see also discussion infra Part III.B.

2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM

390

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2

its effect on the goal of antiretaliation protection: to increase
compliance with the law. Moreover, the application of the standard in
Breeden may have encouraged subsequent courts to place themselves
in the position of the employee and assume too much legal
knowledge, thereby inappropriately scrutinizing the employee’s
whistleblowing complaint.75 In Part III, this Article addresses how the
Antiretaliation Principle could better inform the application of
Breeden’s reasonable person standard.
The Court also has read other statutory antiretaliation provisions
more narrowly than the Antiretaliation Principle might have required.
In Graham County Soil and Water Conservation District v. United
States ex rel. Wilson (Graham County I),76 for example, the Court
held that the statute of limitations for the retaliation provision of the
False Claims Act77 (“FCA”) should be based on the most closely
analogous state limitations period, rather than the (likely longer) sixyear statute of limitations that applies to the other provisions of the
Act.78
The Court recognized that the limitations provision was
“ambiguous,” but ignored the Antiretaliation Principle.79 Instead, the
Court based its holding on the application of several different
principles of statutory construction rather than a consideration of
whether various statutes of limitations would encourage or discourage
employees to report illegal conduct.80 As the dissent noted, the
Court’s holding might undermine the Antiretaliation Principle by
leaving some whistleblowers at the mercy of state statutes of
limitations that likely are shorter than the FCA’s six-year limitations
period.81 Privileging the Antiretaliation Principle over other canons of
statutory construction, as the Court did in the five recent statutory
retaliation cases,82 could have led to stronger retaliation protection—
the outcome advocated by the dissent.83
75 See discussion infra Part III.B (providing examples of lower courts inappropriately
applying Breeden’s reasonable-belief standard).
76 545 U.S. 409 (2005).
77 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) (2006).
78 Graham Cnty. I, 545 U.S. at 422.
79 Id. at 415–17.
80 Id. at 418–19.
81 See id. at 427–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
82 See discussion infra Part II.C.
83 See Graham Cnty. I, 545 U.S. at 427–28 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“I would read the
statute to do what the statute says Congress wanted: to provide a relatively long, single, uniform
limitations period that, in practice, seems to protect the many real potential plaintiffs, such as
relator, who will otherwise find themselves shut out of court.”). Similarly, in Saudi Arabia v.
Nelson, 507 U.S. 349 (1993), the Court narrowly read the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act to
exclude a whistleblower’s retaliation claim. However, the Court never examined or mentioned
the Antiretaliation Principle. Id. at 362–63. Instead of focusing on whistleblower issues, the
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More recently, the Court undermined qui tam whistleblower rights
under the False Claims Act by finding that whistleblowers could not
rely on disclosures made in state and local administrative reports.84
Although Graham County II did not address the FCA’s retaliation
provision, it likely will reduce the number of whistleblowers
potentially protected from retaliation simply because it narrows the
scope of an employee’s “protected activity” that triggers
antiretaliation protection.85 That said, the Court’s opinion focused
more on the balancing necessary in a qui tam case, rather than on the
balancing retaliation cases require.86 Moreover, even in Graham
County II, the Court actually reinforced the core law-enforcement
tenet of the Antiretaliation Principle. The Court defended its holding
by noting that it would not give state and local governments a way to
immunize themselves from a qui tam lawsuit, which would increase
illegal fraud.87 If state and local governments disclosed fraud in an
administrative report, then the United States and the “most deserving”
whistleblowers could still bring a qui tam action to ensure the law is
enforced.88
Taken together, these few “limiting” cases may nibble around the
edges of the Antiretaliation Principle. They do not, however,
undermine the Principle’s power when explaining the balance of
Supreme Court retaliation jurisprudence and its broad recognition of
the importance of antiretaliation protection. During the last fifty
years, the Court’s retaliation jurisprudence involving statutory cases
sends a clear message: employees play an important role in enforcing

Court’s analysis focused on whether the alleged retaliatory action was “commercial” or
conducted pursuant to the police power of a foreign sovereign nation. Id. at 360–63.
84 See Graham Cnty. Soil & Water Conservation Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson
(Graham County II), 130 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (2010) (“The question before us is whether the
reference to ‘administrative’ reports, audits, and investigations in that provision encompasses
disclosures made in state and local sources as well as federal sources. We hold that it does.”).
85 See, e.g., McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F. Supp. 2d 672, 685–86 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
(finding that the plaintiff did not engage in protected conduct by filing a qui tam action because
his complaint was based on publicly available information, and, therefore, was not “in
furtherance” of an action under the False Claims Act, as required by the FCA’s retaliation
provision).
86 The Court described the goal of the qui tam provision as “[s]eeking the golden mean
between adequate incentives for whistle-blowing insiders with genuinely valuable information
and discouragement of opportunistic plaintiffs who have no significant information to contribute
of their own.” Graham County II, 130 S. Ct. at 1406 (quoting United States ex rel. Springfield
Terminal Ry. Co. v. Quinn, 14 F.3d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
87 Id. at 1410–11.
88 Id. at 1410. The Court identified whistleblowers who were the original source of the
information about the fraud as the “most deserving” whistleblowers who would not be hurt by
the rule. Id.
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statutory laws and the Court will provide employees broad protection
from retaliation in order to enhance enforcement of those laws.
B. First Amendment Protection
The Court’s First Amendment retaliation jurisprudence provides a
slightly more nuanced application of the Antiretaliation Principle.
Although the Antiretaliation Principle informs the Court’s
jurisprudence regarding First Amendment protections for government
employees who disclose illegal conduct, it does not drive the
decisions in the same way as with statutory claims.
Beginning with Pickering v. Board of Education,89 the Court has
held that the First Amendment can prohibit the government from
retaliating against employees who speak out as citizens regarding
matters of public concern.90 As recently put by the Court, “So long as
employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern,
they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for
their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.”91 This “public
concern” test provides potentially broader protection than the
Antiretaliation Principle’s “law enforcement” focus because protected
employee speech may involve a matter of public concern, but not any
violation of the law.92 As a result, the Court’s incorporation of the
Principle in its First Amendment case law requires a more nuanced
examination of the cases.
First, in accordance with the Antiretaliation Principle, the Court
repeatedly has emphasized that the First Amendment must protect
government employees because these employees often have
knowledge the public would want to know about government
operations. For example, in the seminal Pickering case, the Court
prohibited a school district from discharging a teacher for his public
comments about school funding.93 The Court protected the teacher
from retaliation, in part, because

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
See id. at 568 (“To the extent that the [lower court’s] opinion may be read to suggest
that [employees] may constitutionally be compelled to relinquish the First Amendment rights
they would otherwise enjoy as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection
with the operation of [their workplaces], it proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally
rejected in numerous prior decisions of this Court.”).
91 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006).
92 See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574 (holding that the First Amendment protected a teacher
who spoke about school budget issues from dismissal because the topic was a matter of public
concern).
93 See id. (“[A] teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may
not furnish the basis for his dismissal from public employment.”).
89
90
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[t]eachers are, as a class, the members of a community most
likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds
allotted to the operation of the schools should be spent.
Accordingly, it is essential that they be able to speak out
freely on such questions without fear of retaliatory
dismissal.94
Similarly, in Waters v. Churchill,95 the Court recognized that
“[g]overnment employees are often in the best position to know what
ails the agencies for which they work; public debate may gain much
from their informed opinions.”96 The Court’s use of the
Antiretaliation Principle in First Amendment cases recognizes
employees’ special knowledge and protects them from retaliation in
order to encourage their disclosure of this information.
Second, the Court’s First Amendment test considers not just the
balance between the employee and employer’s rights, but also
requires that courts balance society’s right to information as well. For
example, in Pickering, the Court upheld a First Amendment
retaliation claim to protect the “public interest in having free and
unhindered debate on matters of public importance.”97 In later cases,
the Court expressed concern for retaliation protection in this area
because the fear of discharge could “chill” employee participation in
public affairs, which would damage larger societal interests.98 The
Court’s most explicit articulation of this came in City of San Diego v.
Roe99:

94 Id. at 572; see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (noting that many other categories of
public employees also have informed and definite opinions about issues related to their job).
95 511 U.S. 661 (1994) (plurality opinion).
96 Id. at 674 (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 572); see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543
U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam) (noting that public employees have “informed opinions on
important public issues”).
97 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573.
98 See, e.g., Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, Waubaunsee Cnty., Kan. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668,
674 (1996) (noting that an independent contractor relationship with the government “provides a
valuable financial benefit, the threat of the loss of which in retaliation for speech may chill
speech on matters of public concern by those who, because of their dealings with the
government, ‘are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for which they work’”
(quoting Waters, 511 U.S. at 674)); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144–45 (1983) (“In all of
these cases, the precedents in which Pickering is rooted, the invalidated statutes and actions
sought to suppress the rights of public employees to participate in public affairs. The issue was
whether government employees could be prevented or ‘chilled’ by the fear of discharge from
joining political parties and other associations that certain public officials might find
‘subversive.’”); cf. Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (noting
the “chilling effect” speech-based retaliation had on nongovernment employees, which the “free
speech” provision of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act aimed to prevent).
99 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
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Underlying the decision in Pickering is the recognition that
public employees are often the members of the community
who are likely to have informed opinions as to the operations
of their public employers, operations which are of substantial
concern to the public. Were they not able to speak on these
matters, the community would be deprived of informed
opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as
much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it
is the employee’s own right to disseminate it.100
The “public concern” doctrinal requirement acknowledges that more
is at stake than simply the employer-employee relationship. The
government is an employer, but it cannot restrict speech in which
society might be interested. Consistent with the Antiretaliation
Principle, this constitutional test differs from the Court’s typical focus
in nonretaliation employment cases by considering society’s interest
in protecting employees with important information.
Third, the Court has recognized that much of this First
Amendment–protected speech necessarily will relate to employee
reports regarding violations of the law.101 In Givhan v. Western Line
Consolidated School District,102 a teacher informed her principal in a
series of private meetings that the school district’s policies were
discriminatory.103 Because Givhan concerned the expression of
opinion in private settings, the Court did not discuss the plaintiff’s
speech under the rubric of “public concern.” Several years later,
however, in Connick v. Myers,104 the Court recognized that the subject
matter of Givhan’s statements about illegality clearly involved a
matter of public concern.105
In Connick, the Court provided significant insight regarding its
views on the First Amendment and retaliation. Specifically, the Court
found that an employee’s behavior was, for the most part, not
protected activity because the employee had not spoken on a matter of
100 Id.

at 82 (citation omitted).
protecting speech related to a “public concern,” the Court certainly has a purpose
broader than solely enhancing law enforcement—the Court encourages debate related to a wide
range of topics. As described in the following text, however, protected topics of “public
concern” often relate to employee reports of illegal conduct.
102 439 U.S. 410 (1979).
103 Id. at 411–14.
104 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
105 Id. at 146 (“Although the subject matter of Mrs. Givhan’s statements were [sic] not the
issue before the Court, it is clear that her statements concerning the School District’s allegedly
racially discriminatory policies involved a matter of public concern.”); id. at 148 n.8 (noting that
Givhan’s protest regarding the school’s racially discriminatory policy was “a matter inherently
of public concern”).
101 By
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public concern.106 The Court contrasted the nonprotected speech in
Connick with examples of speech that would be protected, such as
“bring[ing] to light actual or potential wrongdoing or breach[ing the]
public trust on the part of [other government employees].”107 Thus,
although the “public concern” test is not solely about law
enforcement, the Court certainly has supported the Antiretaliation
Principle by providing First Amendment protection to government
employees who bring illegalities to light.108
Particularly in constitutional cases, the Principle does not mean
that employees always win. In several constitutional cases after
Pickering, the Court determined that the First Amendment did not
protect the employee who brought a claim. None of these cases,
however, involved an employee who claimed protection because the
he or she identified illegal employer conduct. Instead, losing
employees claimed protection based on speech unrelated to illegal
conduct, including complaints about a school’s teacher dress code,109
public statements criticizing a federal agency,110 criticisms of a public
hospital’s nurse-staffing policy,111 and personnel matters.112
Indeed, before Garcetti, whether the Court granted First
Amendment protection to employee speech correlated precisely with
106 Id.

at 147–49.
at 148.
108 This conclusion must be tempered somewhat by the Court’s decision in Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006), in which the Court held that the First Amendment did not
protect an employee who reported misconduct if that report was made as part of the employee’s
job duties. Id. at 421 (“We hold that when public employees make statements pursuant to their
official duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and
the Constitution does not insulate their communications from employer discipline.”). For a more
detailed discussion of this case and explanation of this discrepancy, see infra Part II.B–C.
109 See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 282 (1977) (concerning
the petitioner’s divulgence of the substance of a dress code memorandum, which had been
distributed by the principal to several teachers, to a local radio station).
110 See Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367, 369 (1983) (“[Petitioner] made a number of public
statements, including two televised interviews, that were highly critical of [NASA].”).
111 See Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 664–66 (1994) (plurality opinion). In Waters,
the parties disputed the precise speech involved, but the Court found that even if the employee’s
version was true, she had conducted the speech in a disruptive manner, thereby “outweigh[ing]
whatever First Amendment value it might have had.” Id. at 680.
112 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48 (1983) (concerning an employee who claimed
protection for discussing workplace grievances). One part of Connick presents a tough question:
Did the Court uphold a retaliatory discharge against a person who had reported illegal conduct?
The answer to that question, most likely, is “no.”
In Connick, the respondent had distributed a questionnaire to other employees, and the
Court found that only one question involved a matter of public concern: whether employees
ever felt pressure to work on political campaigns for candidates supported by the government
employer. Id. at 149. The Court found that this question involved “coercion of belief in violation
of fundamental constitutional rights.” Id. The Court held, however, that the Pickering balancing
of interests did not support permitting a constitutional retaliation claim because the
“questionnaire touched upon matters of public concern in only a most limited sense.” Id. at 154.
107 Id.
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whether the speech related to reports of illegality. An employee
reported a violation of law in each of the only two cases since
Pickering in which the Court upheld a First Amendment claim. In
Givhan, the employee made an internal report about potential
violations of discrimination laws.113 In Board of County
Commissioners, Wabaunsee County, Kansas v. Umbehr,114 the Court
extended First Amendment protection to an independent contractor
(as opposed to an employee) who made critical statements about a
county government, including an accusation that the county had
violated the law.115
As with statutory violations, some of the Supreme Court’s First
Amendment decisions actually seem to undermine retaliation
protection. For example, the Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle116 provides employers
with an affirmative defense in First Amendment retaliation cases if
the employer can demonstrate that it would have made the same
employment decision, even in the absence of the employee’s
protected conduct.117 Congress has subsequently adopted this
affirmative defense in several whistleblower statutes118 and courts
often incorporate it when construing other antiretaliation
protections.119 Although this decision provides less protection to
employees, it does not necessarily do so at the expense of the
Principle. In fact, the Court implicitly considered the Principle when
113 Givhan

v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 412–13 (1979).
U.S. 668 (1996).
115 See id. at 671 (“Umbehr spoke at the Board’s meetings, and wrote critical letters and
editorials in local newspapers regarding the County’s landfill user rates, the cost of obtaining
official documents from the County, alleged violations by the Board of the Kansas Open
Meetings Act, the County’s alleged mismanagement of taxpayers’ money, and other topics.”).
116 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
117 See id. at 287 (“Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent
to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this conduct was a ‘substantial
factor’ . . . in the Board’s decision not to rehire him. Respondent having carried that burden,
however, the District Court should have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as to respondent’s
reemployment even in the absence of the protected conduct.”).
118 See, e.g., Wendell H. Ford Aviation Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century
§ 519, 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006) (“Notwithstanding a finding by the Secretary that
the complainant has made the showing required under clause (i), no investigation otherwise
required under subparagraph (A) shall be conducted if the employer demonstrates, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action
in the absence of that behavior.”); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1514A(b)(2)(C) (2006) (adopting the legal burdens of proof in 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)). Unlike
the standard set forth in Mt. Healthy, which requires only a “preponderance of the evidence” for
a successful affirmative defense, these statutes require employers to prove this affirmative
defense by “clear and convincing evidence.”
119 See DANIEL P. WESTMAN & NANCY M. MODESITT, WHISTLEBLOWING: THE LAW OF
RETALIATORY DISCHARGE 234–35 & n.42 (2d ed. 2004) (discussing how Mt. Healthy’s “butfor” standard is applied in other cases involving different antiretaliation statutes).
114 518
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it reached this result, finding that the “constitutional principle at stake
is sufficiently vindicated” when employers are still able to make an
employment decision based on an employee’s nonprotected
conduct.120 According to the Court, for all of the good that
government employees can do when they bring misconduct to public
light, they should not be able to put themselves in a “better position”
as a result of their disclosure than they would have been in had they
remained silent.121 Consistent with the Antiretaliation Principle,
government employees who engage in constitutionally protected
speech will be protected in the first instance. Mt. Healthy affirms that
Principle, even if it makes clear that protected speech will not
inoculate an employee from disciplinary action based on other
conduct.122
Yet, despite incorporating and identifying aspects of the
Antiretaliation Principle in its constitutional retaliation cases, the
Court has indicated at least one substantive limit, even when
employees report potential violations of the law: Statutes, not the
Constitution, should drive the Principle.
In Bush v. Lucas,123 the Court prohibited a federal employee from
bringing a First Amendment retaliation case for damages against a
supervisor.124 In that case, the Court recognized the Antiretaliation
Principle, but thought that existing statutory protections under the
Civil Service Reform Act sufficiently protected the Principle: “In the
past [Congress] has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level
Government employees are a valuable source of information, and that
supervisors might improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates’
freedom of expression.”125 Given the presence of the Civil Service
Reform Act protections, the Court determined that it should not
second-guess Congress’ conclusion regarding the extent to which the
Principle should be protected.126
120 Mt.

Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285.
id.
122 Of course, fact finders may have an extremely difficult time applying this standard in
reality, as it requires a relatively difficult inquiry into employer motives. The point here is that
the Court upheld the core tenet of the Principle, even as it was finding against a whistleblowing
employee in this particular case.
123 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
124 Id. at 385–90. The Court also noted that the administrative and judicial procedures
already in place provided appropriate avenues to redress improper conduct and bring
constitutional challenges against agency action. Id. Although the employee in Bush did not
report a violation of the law, the Court’s holding is broad enough that it could prohibit
constitutional damages even in the case of federal employees who report illegalities. Id. at 388–
90.
125 Id. at 389.
126 See id. (“In all events, Congress is in a far better position than a court to evaluate the
impact of a new species of litigation between federal employees on the efficiency of the civil
121 See
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Thus, for the most part, prior to 2006 the Court’s First Amendment
retaliation cases recognized and advanced the Antiretaliation
Principle. Because society has an important interest in learning about
the valuable information known by government employees, the
Constitution protects government employees who reported violations
of the law. The Court did, however, impose a limitation on the
Principle based on the Court’s understanding that statutes, not the
Constitution, should drive antiretaliation protection if statutes
addressed the issue.
II. THE PRESENT: SIX RETALIATION CASES IN FIVE YEARS
The Supreme Court’s six recent retaliation cases build on this
extensive jurisprudence and reflect the Court’s historical recognition
of the Antiretaliation Principle. Five of these decisions explored the
extent to which various federal statutes prohibited retaliation in the
employment context. Three of these statutory cases involved implied
protection from retaliation in three different statutes without an
express antiretaliation provision.127 The other two analyzed the
express antiretaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.128
As explained below, the Court provided broad retaliation
protection in all five statutory cases, often with explicit reference to
the Principle, despite traditional statutory interpretation and policy
rationales that might support more narrow holdings. In Garcetti v.
Ceballos, the lone constitutional case among the six recent decisions,
the Court explicitly recognized the Principle, but also continued its

service. Not only has Congress developed considerable familiarity with balancing governmental
efficiency and the rights of employees, but it also may inform itself through factfinding
procedures such as hearings that are not available to the courts. Nor is there any reason to
discount Congress’ ability to make an evenhanded assessment of the desirability of creating a
new remedy for federal employees who have been demoted or discharged for expressing
controversial views.”).
127 See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008) (recognizing implied
protection from retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1981); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931
(2008) (recognizing implied protection from retaliation under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act); Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 171 (2005) (recognizing
implied protection from retaliation under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972).
128 See Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 129 S. Ct. 846, 849 (2009) (holding that Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 retaliation protection extends to employees “who speak[] out about
discrimination not on [their] own initiative, but in answering questions during an employer’s
internal investigation”); Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006)
(holding that the retaliation-protection provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
covers all employer actions “that would [be] materially adverse to a reasonable employee or job
applicant”).
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more limited view of retaliation protections in constitutional cases
based on the Court’s preference for statutory coverage.129
The first two Sections that follow briefly describe these six recent
cases and summarize the Court’s decisions. The third Section
analyzes the cases in light of the Court’s historic use of the
Antiretaliation Principle.
A. Statutory Protection
Statutory antiretaliation protection can be either express or
implied. Express provisions provide the most common form of
protection: over thirty-five federal statutes contain an explicit
provision protecting employees from retaliation for undertaking
various protected activities.130 These statutes often detail the type of
employees and employers covered by the provision, the type of
activity in which employees must engage to be protected, and the type
of remedy available to employees.131 More rarely, a court will find a
statute that does not provide explicit protection nevertheless contains
implicit antiretaliation safeguards.132 Because of a general judicial
reluctance to imply statutory remedies, the Court upheld only one
implied retaliation claim prior to 2005—Sullivan v. Little Hunting
Park, Inc.—and that case did not involve an employee.133 Beginning
in 2005, however, the Court upheld implied retaliation claims by
employees in three separate cases involving three separate statutes.
1. Implied Retaliation Protection
The first of these three cases, Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education,134 involved a claim by a high-school teacher and
basketball coach. The plaintiff claimed he had received negative
evaluations and was fired from his coaching position because he
complained that the girls’ basketball team was receiving unequal

129 See

discussion infra Part II.B–C.
WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 119, at 319–20 (compiling statutes with
express antiretaliation protections).
131 See Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
975, 981–83 (2008) (discussing some of the types of employers and employees, as well as the
types of conduct, protected by various federal antiretaliation provisions).
132 See KOHN, supra note 26, at 87–88 (discussing the doctrine of “implied private cause of
action” for establishing whistleblower protections in the absence of express statutory
provisions).
133 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (holding that a white
property owner had standing to file a 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim after a homeowners’ association
retaliated against him for leasing his house to a black man); see also discussion supra Part I.A.
134 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
130 See
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treatment.135 The plaintiff asserted his claim of retaliation under Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,136 which generally
prohibits discrimination “on the basis of sex” in federally funded
education programs.137
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that Title IX did not
provide a private right of action for retaliation because the statutory
language failed to include an express antiretaliation provision.138 By
contrast, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, passed only eight
years before Title IX, contains a very specific antiretaliation provision
that serves as the model for many modern retaliation protections. 139
According to the Birmingham Board of Education, Title VII
demonstrated that Congress knew how to write a specific
antiretaliation provision.140 The Board further argued that the absence
of such a specific provision in Title IX meant that Congress must
have purposefully excluded retaliation protection from the statute.141
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court disagreed with the
Board, reversed the Eleventh Circuit, and found an implied claim for
retaliation in Title IX.142 The Court used three arguments to overcome
the problem presented by Title IX’s silence regarding retaliation.
First, the Court asserted that “discrimination” should be construed
broadly to cover “a wide range of intentional unequal treatment.”143 In
other words, the Court found that “retaliation is discrimination ‘on the
135 Id.

at 171–72.
at 171.
137 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006) (“No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex,
be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . .”).
138 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 1333, 1338 (11th Cir. 2002). The court
of appeals also found that a Department of Education regulation prohibiting retaliation could not
create, on its own, a private right of action. Id. at 1346.
139 See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (“It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer to discriminate against any of his employees . . . because he has opposed any practice
made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII], or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under [Title VII].”). Other antidiscrimination statutes provide antiretaliation protection with
similar provisions based on the language in Title VII. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d) (2006) (using language identical to Title
VII to prohibit retaliation against employees who oppose age discrimination); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503, 42 U.S.C. § 12203 (2006) (using language identical to Title VII
to prohibit retaliation against individuals who oppose discrimination against disabled persons).
140 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175 (noting that the Board urged the Court to compare Title
IX with Title VII).
141 Id.; see also id. at 189–90 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (comparing Title IX to Title VII’s
explicit antiretaliation provision and asserting that the absence of a specific retaliation provision
is “significant”).
142 Id. at 171 (majority opinion). Justice O’Connor authored the majority opinion. Id.
Justice Thomas filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices Scalia
and Kennedy. Id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
143 Id. at 175 (majority opinion).
136 Id.
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basis of sex’ because it is an intentional response to the nature of the
complaint: an allegation of sex discrimination.”144
Second, in an interesting twist on the defendant’s argument
regarding statutory silence, the Court noted that Title VII “is a vastly
different statute from Title IX”145 because Title IX contains a general
prohibition on discrimination, while Title VII provides very specific
examples of conduct that constitutes unlawful discrimination.146 Thus,
“[b]ecause Congress did not list any specific discriminatory practices
when it wrote Title IX, its failure to mention one such practice does
not tell [the Court] anything about whether it intended that practice to
be covered.”147
Third, the Jackson Court relied on Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
Inc.,148 a thirty-six-year-old case, as precedent for interpreting a
general prohibition on discrimination to include a claim for
retaliation.149 Although Justice Thomas, in a dissent joined by three
other Justices, claimed that Sullivan was a standing case that merely
permitted the white property owner to assert the claim of the black
tenant,150 the majority found that “Sullivan’s holding was not so
limited.”151 Rather, for the Jackson majority, Sullivan “plainly held
that the white owner could maintain his own private cause of action
under § 1982 if he could show that he was ‘punished for trying to
vindicate the rights of minorities.’”152 Because the Court viewed
Sullivan’s holding as implying a claim of retaliation in a general
discrimination statute, the Court found that Congress likely intended
the same interpretation for Title IX, which was passed only three
years after the Court decided Sullivan.153 Moreover, not only did the
Court hold that Title IX includes an implied claim of retaliation, but it
also relied on Sullivan to find that the retaliation claim protects both
the original victims of discrimination as well as a third party (like
Coach Jackson) who complains about the original discrimination.154
As Justice Thomas noted in his dissent, the majority had created “an

144 Id.
145 Id.

at 174 (emphasis added).
at 175 (citing Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 283–84, 286–87

(1998)).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 396

U.S. 229 (1969)).
544 U.S. at 176 (stating that because Congress enacted Title IX merely three
years after Sullivan, that case provides a good context for interpreting the statute).
150 Id. at 194–95 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 176 n.1 (majority opinion).
152 Id. (quoting Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237).
153 Id. at 176.
154 Id. at 179–80.
149 Jackson,
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entirely new cause of action for a secondary rights holder, beyond the
claim of the original rights holder.”155
In two cases decided in 2008, the Court returned to the issue
presented by Jackson: whether a general antidiscrimination provision
also provides an implied claim of retaliation. The first case, CBOCS
West, Inc. v. Humphries,156 examined 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to determine
if it “encompasses a complaint of retaliation against a person who has
complained about a violation of another person’s contract-related
‘right.’”157 Like § 1982 in Sullivan and Title IX in Jackson, § 1981
does not include an explicit antiretaliation provision; rather, the
statute generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of race in
“mak[ing] and enforc[ing] contracts.”158 Nevertheless, as in Sullivan
and Jackson, the Supreme Court in CBOCS West found an implied
claim of retaliation contained in this general language.159
This time, unlike in Jackson, the Court did not debate the meaning
of Sullivan or whether a general antidiscrimination statute could
include specific protection from retaliation.160 Rather, the Court found
that Jackson definitively resolved those issues and, therefore, the
CBOCS West holding rested “in significant part upon principles of
stare decisis.”161 The fact that the Court previously interpreted § 1981
similarly to § 1982 (at issue in Sullivan) only added to the stare
decisis rationale.162
In some respects, CBOCS West represents even stronger support
for implied-retaliation claims than Jackson. Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito joined the Court between the Jackson and CBOCS West
decisions, which many commentators predicted would make the
Court more employer oriented than the Jackson Court.163 Yet, despite
155 Id.

at 194 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
S. Ct. 1951 (2008).
157 Id. at 1954. The employee in CBOCS West was dismissed because he had complained
to managers that an assistant manager had fired a coworker on the basis of race. Id.
158 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States
shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . .”
(emphasis added)).
159 CBOCS West, 128 S. Ct. at 1954, 1959.
160 The CBOCS West Court accepted Jackson’s interpretation that Sullivan permitted a
retaliation claim under § 1982. Id. at 1955 (“[T]his Court has made clear that Sullivan stands for
the proposition that § 1982 encompasses retaliation claims.” (citing Jackson v. Birmingham Bd.
of Educ. 544 U.S. 167, 176 (2005))). To overcome the defendant’s argument that the text of
§ 1981 did not explicitly include protection from retaliation, the Court also relied on Jackson’s
interpretation that Title IX encompassed retaliation claims even though it does not use the word
“retaliation.” Id. at 1958 (“Despite the fact that Title IX does not use the word ‘retaliation,’ the
Court held in Jackson that the statute’s language encompassed such a claim . . . .”).
161 Id. at 1955.
162 See id. at 1955–56 (“While the Sullivan decision interpreted § 1982, our precedents
have long construed §§ 1981 and 1982 similarly.”).
163 See, e.g., ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NOMINATION OF JOHN G. ROBERTS
156 128
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these changes to the Court’s composition, the Court decided CBOCS
West with a seven-justice majority that included Roberts and Alito,164
a larger margin than the five-to-four Jackson decision.165
Moreover, in at least one way, the CBOCS West employee-plaintiff
had to overcome a stronger argument based on the statutory language
of § 1981 than the Jackson plaintiff had to address under Title IX.
Recent congressional amendments to § 1981 gave support to those
who argued that the statute did not protect employees from retaliation
because the amendments failed to address retaliation specifically. In
1989, the Court held in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union166 that the
antidiscrimination language of § 1981 (“to make and enforce
contracts”) did not apply to “conduct by the employer after the
contract relation has been established, including breach of the terms
of the contract or imposition of discriminatory working
conditions.”167 Although Patterson did not specifically involve a
retaliation claim, various appellate courts have interpreted Patterson
to preclude retaliation claims under § 1981 because most retaliation
victims oppose discriminatory conduct after the formation of the
contract, thus taking whistleblowing employees out of § 1981’s
protective scope.168 Two years after Patterson, Congress passed the

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 3 (2005), available at www.afj.org/afj_roberts
_prehearing_report.pdf (“Judge Roberts’ apparent view of Congress’ authority potentially
threatens a wide swath of legislation rooted in the Commerce Clause, including civil rights
safeguards, minimum wage and maximum hour laws, clean air, clean water, and workplace
safety protections.”); Editorial, Judge Alito’s Radical Views, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at A18
(“Judge Alito has consistently shown a bias in favor of those in power over those who need the
law to protect them. Women, racial minorities, the elderly and workers who come to court
seeking justice should expect little sympathy.”); Press Release, National Women’s Law Center,
Judge Alito’s Record Highly Troubling on Women’s Rights (Oct. 31, 2005), available at
http://www.nwlc.org/press-release/judge-alitos-record-highly-troubling-womens-rights (“[Alito]
has issued decisions making it harder for victims of race and sex discrimination to prove their
cases.”); John R. Kroger, Bench Brawl, SALON.COM (Oct. 31, 2005, 1:24 PM), http://www.salon
.com/news/opinion/feature/2005/10/31/alito_reax (noting Alito’s conservative record in
employment cases); More Groups Announce Opposition to Roberts, NOMINATION WATCH . ORG
(Sept. 21, 2005, 4:51 PM), http://www.nominationwatch.org/2005/09/more_groups_ann.html
(noting labor and union group opposition to Roberts’ confirmation); Michael Scherer, Why Big
Business Hearts John Roberts, SALON.COM (Aug. 11, 2005, 7:01 PM), http://www.salon.com
/news/feature/2005/08/11/roberts_business (discussing that the nomination of John Roberts to
the Supreme Court would support the interests of businesses and corporations).
164 Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Alito. CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1954. Justice Thomas
wrote a dissenting opinion that was joined by Justice Scalia. Id.
165 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 169 (2005).
166 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
167 Id. at 177 (emphasis added).
168 See CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1956–57 (listing the circuit courts of appeals cases that
barred retaliation claims under § 1981).
TO THE
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Civil Rights Act of 1991,169 which explicitly overruled the case by
adding a new subsection to § 1981: “For purposes of this section, the
term ‘make and enforce contracts’ includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual
relationship.”170 Notably, the amended provision did not explicitly
provide antiretaliation protection.
The absence of antiretaliation language in the 1991 amendments
presented more difficulty for the CBOCS West plaintiff than the
statutory silence in Title IX at issue in Jackson, for two reasons. First,
immediately before and after the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress
enacted several very specific antiretaliation provisions in other
employment statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities Act of
1990,171 the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993,172 and the
Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Act of 1994.173
Then, in 1994, Congress amended the Surface Transportation
Assistance Act of 1982 to include explicit antiretaliation protection.174
In other words, Congress clearly knew how to enact an explicit
antiretaliation provision and how to amend an older statute to include
one. Congress, however, chose not to include a specific antiretaliation
provision in its amendment of § 1981, which could indicate a specific
intent to exclude retaliation claims from § 1981’s coverage.
Second, by 1991, the Supreme Court had begun requiring that
courts strictly construe statutory language when determining whether
an implied right of action existed—a change from the judicial
atmosphere in 1972 when Congress passed Title IX. Notably, two
years before Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which
amended § 1981, Patterson required a narrow textual reading of
§ 1981 specifically.175 More broadly, since 1975 in Cort v. Ash,176 the
Court has made it clear that it would focus its statutory interpretation
efforts on the literal text, rather than the more permissive pre-Cort
emphasis on legislative purpose.177 Thus, even if Congress could have
169 Pub.

L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
U.S.C. § 1981(b) (2006).
171 Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 503, 104 Stat. 327, 370 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a)–(b)
(2006)).
172 Pub. L. No. 103-3, § 105, 107 Stat. 6, 14 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 2615 (2006)).
173 Pub. L. No. 103-353, § 2(a), 108 Stat. 3149, 3153 (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 4311(b)
(2006)).
174 Pub. L. No. 103-272, § 1(e), 108 Stat. 745, 990 (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 31105 (2006)).
175 See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181 (1989) (noting that § 1981 is
“limited to the enumerated rights within its express protection, specifically the right to make and
enforce contracts”).
176 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
177 See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION:
170 42
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had Sullivan’s purportedly broad reading of § 1982 on its mind when
it passed Title IX in 1972, as the Jackson Court concluded,178
Congress would have known in 1991 that it needed to include explicit
language regarding protection from retaliation in its statutes.179 Thus,
the primary statutory-interpretation argument utilized by the Court in
Jackson held much less power when the CBOCS West Court
evaluated the changes the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made to § 1981.
The Court dismissed these arguments, however, by pointing to the
1991 Act’s legislative history. The Court cited a House Report
indicating that the amended provision would provide protection from
a long list of employment actions, including retaliation.180 Moreover,
the Court put great emphasis on a footnote in that same Report, which
noted that the legislation would restore the right to sue for retaliation.
The courts previously had assumed that this right was eliminated
under Patterson.181 Therefore, because the purpose of the 1991 Act
was to nullify Patterson, the Court concluded that Congress also must
have intended to “embrace pre-Patterson law,” including Sullivan.182
The Supreme Court’s second implied retaliation case in 2008,
Gomez-Perez v. Potter,183 involved a provision of the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967184 (ADEA) that addresses
age discrimination against federal employees (as opposed to privatesector employees).185 Section 15(a) of the ADEA, codified at 29
U.S.C. § 633a(a), states that all employment decisions affecting

STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 1131 (4th ed. 2007) (noting that Cort v. Ash
“marks a watershed in the legisprudence of implied causes of action. Before Cort, private causes
of action were usually implied; after Cort, usually not.”); see also Humphries v. CBOCS W.,
Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 410 (7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting in part) (“[S]ince the
1970s the Court has lashed interpretation more closely to statutory text.”).
178 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 176–77 (2005).
179 As Chief Judge Easterbrook noted in his partial dissent in the Seventh Circuit case that
led to the Supreme Court’s CBOCS West decision: “There has been a sea change in
interpretative method between Sullivan and today—and Patterson not only exemplifies the
change but also applies it to § 1981. . . . [W]hen § 1981 was amended in 1991, decisions such as
Cort and Rodriguez and Patterson had announced a textual approach.” CBOCS W, 474 F.3d at
411 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting in part).
180 CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1957 (2008) (citing H.R. REP. NO.
102-40, pt. 1, at 92–93 (1991)).
181 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 92 n.92 (1991)).
182 Id. at 1959. Adding to the anomalous nature of this conclusion, the Court recently held
that, when Congress amended Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to benefit plaintiffs—in
an express effort to adjust the “burden of proof” standard that the Court had adopted for Title
VII cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989)—Congress intentionally did not
amend the “burden of proof” standard for ADEA cases. Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,
129 S. Ct. 2343, 2349 (2009).
183 128 S. Ct. 1931 (2008).
184 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2006).
185 29 U.S.C. § 633a.
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federal employees or applicants who are at least forty years of age
“shall be made free from any discrimination based on age.”186 As with
the other implied retaliation cases addressed thus far, the GomezPerez Court decided that this general prohibition on discrimination
included a claim for retaliation.187 The majority in Gomez-Perez
conducted a relatively cursory analysis: the ADEA contains general
language banning discrimination based on age; age is a protected
category similar to race and sex; the Court has already implied
retaliation claims from general language banning discrimination
based on race and sex (in Sullivan and Jackson, respectively);
therefore, a retaliation claim should be implied from the ADEA’s
general antidiscriminatory language.188
The majority’s quick syllogistic analysis and easy reliance on
precedent belie a deeper problem with a claim for retaliation under
§ 633a(a). This problem partially revisits the same issue the § 1981
retaliation claim in CBOCS West confronted regarding the Civil
Rights Act of 1991. That is, how should the Court interpret
congressional silence at a time when Congress included clear
antiretaliation provisions in other statutes?189 In Gomez-Perez,
however, the circumstances surrounding congressional passage of the
federal-government sections of the ADEA presented an even greater
challenge to finding an implied claim for retaliation than the Court
faced in either Jackson or CBOCS West.190
When Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, the Act applied only to
the private sector and included both an antidiscrimination provision
and a separate antiretaliation provision.191 Seven years later, Congress
186 29

U.S.C. § 633a(a).
128 S. Ct. at 1936. The plaintiff in Gomez-Perez claimed that her
employer had retaliated against her for filing an age discrimination complaint. Id. at 1935.
188 Id. at 1937 (“Following the reasoning of Sullivan and Jackson, we interpret the ADEA
federal-sector provision’s prohibition of ‘discrimination based on age’ as likewise proscribing
retaliation. The statutory language at issue here (‘discrimination based on age’) is not materially
different from the language at issue in Jackson (‘“discrimination”’ ‘“on the basis of sex”’) and
is the functional equivalent of the language at issue in Sullivan [(‘discrimination on the basis of
race’)]. And the context in which the statutory language appears is the same in all three cases;
that is, all three cases involve remedial provisions aimed at prohibiting discrimination.” (citation
omitted)). Justice Alito wrote the six-to-three decision. Id. at 1934. Chief Justice Roberts wrote
a dissenting opinion joined in part by Justices Thomas and Scalia. Id. at 1943 (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting). Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Scalia. Id. at 1951
(Thomas, J., dissenting).
189 See supra text accompanying notes 171–79.
190 See Charles A. Shanor, Employment Cases from the 2007–2008 Supreme Court Term,
24 LAB. LAW. 147, 155–56 (2008) (noting that Gomez-Perez was a “harder retaliation case”
than CBOCS West because the ADEA private-sector provision had an antiretaliation provision
and because Gomez-Perez presented a “weaker stare decisis argument”).
191 Pub. L. No. 90-202, § 4, 81 Stat. 602, 603 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 623
(2006)). Section 4(a)(1) made it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any
187 Gomez-Perez,
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passed the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974,192 which
added § 633a to the ADEA to prevent age discrimination against most
executive-branch employees.193 Congress, however, did not include a
specific antiretaliation provision in the amendment covering federal
workers—a distinct difference between the amendment and the
original ADEA applicable to the private sector. Moreover, Congress
was clearly aware of the ADEA’s original provisions protecting
private-sector employees from discrimination and, separately,
retaliation. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in his Gomez-Perez
dissent,194 the amendments made these separate private-sector
provisions applicable to states and their political subdivisions, but
Congress independently enacted § 633a (without a distinct
antiretaliation provision) to apply to the federal government.195 A
further piece of evidence from the 1974 FLSA Amendments suggests
that Congress deliberately chose not to include a separate
antiretaliation provision in the section of the ADEA applicable to
federal employees. As part of the Amendments, Congress amended
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 to extend it, and its
antiretaliation provision, to federal employees.196 Again, as Chief
Justice Roberts argued in dissent, “Congress did not similarly subject
the Federal Government to the express antiretaliation provision in the
ADEA, strongly suggesting that this was a conscious choice.”197
The majority, however, disagreed with the Chief Justice regarding
the meaning of the dissimilar structure utilized by the private-sector

individual . . . because of such individual’s age.” Id. § 4(a)(1) (codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(a)(1)). Section 4(d) prevented retaliation against any employee or applicant who “has
opposed any practice made unlawful by this section, or because such individual . . . has made a
charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
litigation under [the ADEA].” Id. § 4(d) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)).
192 Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 15(a), 88 Stat. 55, 74–75 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 633a (2006)).
193 Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1944 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
194 Id. at 1946 (“Congress obviously had the private-sector ADEA provision prominently
before it when it enacted § 633a, because the same bill that included § 633a also amended the
private-sector provision.”). The Chief Justice cited section 28(a)(4) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 630(b) (2006), which broadened the definition of “employer” to include states and their
political subdivisions. Id.
195 Id. at 1947. As Chief Justice Roberts stated:
Congress specifically chose in the FLSA Amendments to treat States and the
Federal Government differently with respect to the ADEA itself. It subjected the
former to the ADEA’s private-sector provision—including the express prohibition
against retaliation in § 623(d)—while creating § 633a as a stand-alone prohibition
against discrimination in federal employment, without an antiretaliation provision.
This decision evinces a deliberate legislative choice not to extend those portions of
the ADEA’s private-sector provisions that are not expressly included in § 633a . . . .
Id. at 1947–48 (citations omitted).
196 Id. at 1947.
197 Id.
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and the federal-sector provisions. In response to his criticism, the
majority (as it did in CBOCS West) relied heavily on Sullivan. They
claimed that when Congress enacted a “broad, general ban” on age
discrimination, “Congress was presumably familiar with Sullivan and
had reason to expect that this ban would be interpreted ‘in
conformity’ with that precedent.”198 Therefore, the fact that separate
provisions of the ADEA addressed retaliation differently “does not
provide a sufficient reason to depart from the reasoning of Sullivan
and Jackson.”199
2. Explicit Protection: Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
The year after Jackson, the Supreme Court turned to the explicit
antiretaliation provision of Title VII. In Burlington Northern & Santa
Fe Railway Co. v. White,200 the Court had to determine the types of
adverse employment actions that qualify as employer retaliation.201 In
many ways, the case provided a mirror image of Jackson. While
Jackson required the Court to find retaliation protection as an implicit
part of a broad antidiscrimination provision,202 Burlington Northern
emphasized that protection from discrimination differs from
protection from retaliation.203 For Jackson, retaliation was part of
discrimination; for Burlington Northern, retaliation required a
separate analysis. Yet, in both cases, the Court found in favor of
protecting employees from retaliation.
The plaintiff in Burlington Northern claimed that her employer
had retaliated against her for complaining about gender
discrimination. First, her employer reassigned her to a position with
less prestige and more arduous responsibilities. Then, it suspended
her without pay for thirty-seven days (although the company later
reinstated her with back pay).204 To evaluate whether these actions
198 Id. at 1941 (majority opinion); see also id. at 1942 n.6 (using the same rationale to
discredit the Respondent’s argument that the explicit antiretaliation provision in the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 prohibited the existence of an implicit antiretaliation provision in the
ADEA).
199 Id. at 1941.
200 548 U.S. 53 (2006).
201 Id. at 61 (“[We must] decide whether Title VII’s antiretaliation provision forbids only
those employer actions and resulting harms that are related to employment or the workplace.
And we must characterize how harmful an act of retaliatory discrimination must be in order to
fall within the provision’s scope.”).
202 See Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) (“We conclude that
when a funding recipient retaliates against a person because he complains of sex discrimination,
this constitutes intentional ‘discrimination’ ‘on the basis of sex,’ in violation of Title IX.”).
203 Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 62–64 (arguing that there is a difference between
“discrimination” and “retaliation”).
204 Id. at 57–59.
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violated Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, the Court had to
determine the scope of the statute’s provision barring an employer
from “discriminating against” an employee for opposing any practice
made unlawful by Title VII, or for participating in a Title VII
proceeding or investigation.205
Several courts of appeals had determined that Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision should be read to prohibit only adverse
actions related to employment, which would be the same standard that
courts apply to claims made under Title VII’s antidiscrimination
provision.206 Others had taken an even more restrictive approach by
limiting actionable retaliation to “ultimate employment” decisions,
“such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and
compensating.”207 The Supreme Court, however, interpreted Title VII
broadly, holding that it prohibited not only employment-related
retaliation, but also actions unrelated to employment that could have
an impact on an employee’s willingness to report discrimination.208
The Court based its holding on the language and the purpose of
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision.209 First, the language of Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision differs from its antidiscrimination
provision.210 Title VII prohibits discrimination by prohibiting specific
actions related to employment: failing or refusing to hire or discharge,
discriminating with respect to an employee’s compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, or limiting employment
opportunities.211 The antiretaliation provision, however, does not have
205 Id.

at 56–57.
id. at 60 (citing White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry., Co., 364 F.3d 789 (6th Cir.
2004); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001); Robinson v. City of
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)).
207 Id. (quoting Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 707 (5th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Manning v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 127 F.3d 686, 692 (8th
Cir. 1997).
208 Id. at 67–68. The Court decided in favor of the employee with a nine-to-zero vote.
Justice Breyer wrote the majority opinion, which was joined by seven other Justices. Id. at 55.
Justice Alito filed an opinion concurring in the judgment only. Id. at 73 (Alito, J., concurring in
the judgment).
209 Id. at 62–63 (majority opinion).
210 Id. at 61–62.
211 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006). The provision reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer—
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment
in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
206 See
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such limiting language. It prohibits an employer generally from
“discriminat[ing]” against employees or applicants in retaliation.212
Second, the Court found that Congress intended these linguistic
differences to make a “legal difference” because the two provisions
had different purposes as well.213 Because the “substantive”
antidiscrimination provision seeks to prevent discrimination in the
workplace, Congress needed only to prohibit acts related to
employment. The antiretaliation provision, however, aims to prevent
discrimination by blocking an employer from interfering with any
effort by an employee to enforce the statute’s substantive
antidiscrimination objectives.214 To support this objective, Title VII
necessarily must prevent a broader range of employer actions because
of the various nonemployment ways in which an employer could
deter employees from “[m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms.”215
Finally, the Court noted that, although the actionable retaliatory
conduct was broader than discriminatory conduct, it was not limitless.
The Court stated, “it is important to separate significant from trivial
harms.”216 Thus, Title VII’s antiretaliation provision covers all
employer actions “that would have been materially adverse to a
reasonable employee or job applicant.”217 By “materially adverse,”
the Court meant any employer action that “could well dissuade a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.”218 This objective standard recognizes that “petty
slights, minor annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” are not
actionable because they are unlikely to deter employees from
complaining to the EEOC about discrimination.219
Using this standard, the Court found that both the retaliatory
reassignment and the unpaid suspension imposed by the employer in

212 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The provision reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate
against any of his employees or applicants for employment . . . because he has
opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id. (emphasis added).
213 Burlington N., 544 U.S. at 63.
214 Id.
215 Id. at 64 (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346
(1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
216 Id. at 68.
217 Id. at 57.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 68.
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this case violated Title VII because these actions would likely
dissuade an employee from bringing a charge of discrimination.220
Interestingly, as Justice Alito noted, the Court need not have
issued such a broad holding in order to find the employer’s conduct in
violation of Title VII.221 According to Justice Alito, the standards
used in various appellate courts, which limit antiretaliation protection
to “adverse employment actions,” would still have allowed the Court
to declare that the employer’s conduct violated Title VII.222
Nevertheless, in the face of significant differences among the circuits
as to the scope of this provision, the Court decided to clarify the issue
by requiring a standard more protective of employees.
The Supreme Court’s most recent retaliation opinion, issued in
2009, also involved Title VII and its explicit antiretaliation provision.
Crawford v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson
County, Tennessee223 considered whether Title VII’s retaliation
provision protected an employee who participated in an employer’s
internal investigation of a sexual-harassment complaint.224 The
employee claimed that she was fired for responding to her employer’s
questions and reporting that another employee had engaged in sexual
harassment.225
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision protects two types of conduct.
First, it prohibits retaliation against an employee who “has opposed”
an employer’s violation of Title VII.226 Second, the statute protects an
employee who “has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title
VII].”227 The Crawford plaintiff argued that both Title VII’s
“opposition” clause as well as its “participation” clause prohibited
retaliation against her based on her conduct during her employer’s
internal investigation.228
The Court evaluated the claim only under the opposition clause
and determined that the employee’s actions during the investigation
constituted protected conduct.229 The Sixth Circuit viewed the
plaintiff’s conduct as insufficient because it believed Title VII
required
“active,
consistent
‘opposing’
activities
to
220 Id.

at 70–73.
at 79–80 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment).
222 See id.
223 129 S. Ct. 846 (2009).
224 Id. at 849.
225 Id.
226 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006).
227 Id.
228 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
229 Id. at 853.
221 Id.
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warrant . . . protection against retaliation.”230 Relying primarily on the
“ordinary” dictionary meaning of the term “oppose,” the Supreme
Court disagreed.231 As with the Court’s other recent retaliation cases,
this conclusion is debatable; for example, the circuit courts were split
regarding the extent to which Title VII’s antiretaliation provision
requires “active” opposition.232 Moreover, the Court could have
chosen numerous other definitions of “oppose,” including ones that
require much more active and overt resistance.233
Ultimately, the Court reasoned that not protecting employees like
the plaintiff would undermine the effectiveness of the scheme the
Court had implemented in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth234 and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,235 which encouraged employer
internal investigations of sexual-harassment claims.236 Thus,
according to the Court, Title VII’s opposition clause goes beyond
active opposition to protect any form of communication to the
employer in which the employee communicates a belief that the
employer has violated Title VII.237

230 Id. at 851 (omission in original) (quoting Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 211 Fed. App’x 373, 376 (6th Cir. 2006)) (internal quotations omitted).
231 Id. at 850 (“RESIST frequently implies more active striving than OPPOSE.” (quoting
WEBSTER’S NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1710 (2d ed. 1957)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
232 Compare Crawford, 211 Fed. App’x at 376 (requiring active opposition to invoke Title
VII antiretaliation protections), and McNorton v. Ga. Dep’t of Transp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 1360,
1376 (N.D. Ga. 2007) (holding that an employee’s cooperation with an internal investigation did
not meet the required definition of “opposition conduct” for Title VII purposes), with
McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (upholding Title VII antiretaliation
protections for an employee who engaged in “passive” opposition to discrimination).
233 See, e.g., McNorton, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 1375 (noting recent dictionary definitions that
define oppose with active terms); Brief for Respondent at 27, Crawford, 129 S. Ct. 846 (No. 061595), 2008 WL 2066116 (same).
234 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
235 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
236 See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765 (stating that employers could have an affirmative
defense to some sexual-harassment claims so long as they can show that they exercised
reasonable care to prevent and promptly correct employee sexual harassment, and that the
employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s preventative or corrective
opportunities).
According to the Court in Crawford, it was necessary to disavow the Sixth Circuit’s
reasoning and holding because failure to do so would result in an impossible Catch-22: on the
one hand, an employee could be penalized for responding to an employer’s sexual-harassment
inquiries; on the other hand, if the employee failed to respond to those inquiries, then the
employer would have an affirmative to defense to any future Title VII claim because the
employee had unreasonably failed to take advantage of the employer’s preventative or
corrective opportunities. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852.
237 Id. at 851 (holding that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision extends to an employee who
reports sexual harassment during an employer’s inquiry).
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B. First Amendment Protection
In the midst of this series of cases addressing statutory
antiretaliation protection, the Court also addressed the breadth of
protection the First Amendment provides to government employees.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court significantly limited the
circumstances in which an employee may claim constitutional
protection from retaliation. The five-to-four Garcetti majority held
that the First Amendment does not protect public employees from
discipline related to speech made pursuant to their official duties.238
The Garcetti plaintiff, a deputy district attorney, informed his
supervisors in a memo that a sheriff’s affidavit that was being relied
on in a criminal case, contained serious misrepresentations.239 After a
meeting between the plaintiff and his supervisors about the veracity
of the affidavit and the merits of the case, the supervisors decided to
proceed with the prosecution over the plaintiff’s protests.240
Ultimately, the criminal defendant called the plaintiff as a witness,
and he reiterated his misgivings about the sheriff’s affidavit.241 After
the hearing, the plaintiff claimed that the district attorney’s office
violated his First Amendment rights by retaliating against him for the
memo.242
In addressing the claim, the Court initially provided an exhaustive
review of its First Amendment jurisprudence and reiterated that it
required a delicate balancing of the employee’s interest in speaking
out as a citizen and the government employer’s interest in operational
efficiency.243 Importantly, the Court also identified a third interest that
must be balanced: the “public’s interest in receiving the wellinformed views of government employees engaging in civic
discussion.”244 As summarized by the Court, its decisions “have
sought both to promote the individual and societal interests that are
238 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006). Justice Kennedy wrote the majority
opinion, which was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.
Justices Stevens and Breyer each filed a dissent, and Justice Souter filed a third dissent joined
by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg. Id. at 412.
239 Id. at 413–14.
240 Id. at 414.
241 Id. at 414–15.
242 Id. at 415.
243 Id. at 417–19.
244 Id. at 419; see also City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (per curiam)
(“Were [public employees] not able to speak on these matters, the community would be
deprived of informed opinions on important public issues. The interest at stake is as much the
public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the employee’s own right to disseminate
it.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Treasury Emps., 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (“The largescale disincentive to Government employees’ expression also imposes a significant burden on
the public’s right to read and hear what the employees would otherwise have written and said.”).
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served when employees speak as citizens on matters of public
concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting
to perform their important public functions.”245
Within this framework, the Court found that the employee in
Garcetti acted pursuant to his job duties, which the Court interpreted
to mean that he was speaking as an employee rather than as a
citizen.246 According to the Court, this distinction meant that the
government employer had more discretion to control his speech and
to discipline him if the employer found the speech to be too disruptive
or inaccurate.247 “When . . . the employee is simply performing his or
her job duties,” the Constitution does not require the same “delicate
balancing” that is necessary when a government employee speaks as a
private citizen on a matter of public concern.248
The Court seemed attuned to at least one likely consequence of its
holding: that government employees will report misconduct less
frequently. Yet, despite recognizing that “[e]xposing governmental
inefficiency and misconduct is a matter of considerable
significance,”249 the Court ultimately asserted that encouraging
employees to blow the whistle was not necessarily the Constitution’s
job.250 Instead, the Court pointed to other potential safeguards, such as
an employer’s “internal policies and procedures that are receptive to
employee criticism,” a “powerful network of legislative enactments—
such as whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes—available to
those who seek to expose wrongdoing,” and attorney rules of
conduct.251
In dissent, Justice Souter argued for a different sort of balancing,
one that placed more emphasis on society’s interest in government
employee speech. Although Justice Souter recognized a government
employer’s need to manage its workforce, he asserted that society’s
interest “in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to health and
safety can outweigh the government’s stake in the efficient
implementation of policy.”252 Thus, when an employee speaks on a
matter of “unusual importance and satisfies high standards of
responsibility in the way he does it,” the fact that the speech related to
the employee’s job duties should not automatically exclude
245 Garcetti,

547 U.S. at 420.
at 421.
247 Id. at 422–23.
248 Id. at 423.
249 Id. at 425.
250 See id. at 426 (“Our precedents do not support the existence of a constitutional cause of
action behind every statement a public employee makes in the course of doing his or her job.”).
251 Id. at 424–25.
252 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
246 Id.
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protection.253 Justice Souter defined matters of “unusual importance”
to include “official dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action,
other serious wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”254
Justice Stevens wrote a separate dissent in which he called the
majority’s views “misguided” because constitutional protection
should not turn on whether an employee’s words fell within the
employee’s job description.255
Finally, Justice Breyer’s dissent argued that the majority’s “job
duty” rule was too categorical, and that some limited First
Amendment protection should still be provided to speech arising out
of an employee’s professional and constitutional obligations.256
Justice Breyer, however, labeled as “too broad” Justice Souter’s
exception for employee speech on “matters of unusual importance,”
and declared that the exception caused too much judicial interference
in government employment matters.257
C. The Antiretaliation Principle and the Recent Cases
Taken together, the six recent Court opinions dealing with
retaliation appear untethered to any consistent judicial philosophy. In
Jackson, the Court asserted that protection from retaliation was part
of a statute’s general antidiscrimination protection,258 while in
Burlington Northern, the Court upheld broad retaliation protection
because it was different from a statute’s discrimination protection.259
The importance of stare decisis controlled the outcomes of CBOCS
West and Gomez-Perez,260 while in Jackson the Court ignored
important precedent.261 The Court implied broad retaliation protection
when statutes were silent,262 yet refused to imply even modest
253 Id.

at 435.

254 Id.
255 Id.

at 427 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
at 446–47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
257 Id. at 448–49.
258 Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) (finding that retaliation
against one who reports sex discrimination constitutes “sex based discrimination” in violation of
Title IX).
259 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–63 (2006).
260 CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2008) (“[O]ur conclusion rests
in significant part upon principles of stare decisis . . . .”); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct.
1931, 1937 (2008) (resting the Court’s holding on the principles of stare decisis).
261 See Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171–84 (finding an implicit antiretaliation right of action
under Title IX, but not mentioning Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court’s
seminal case on implied rights of action); id. at 177–78 (distinguishing Alexander v. Sandoval,
532 U.S. 275, 281 (2001), where the Court decided not to imply a disparate-impact right of
action under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, a sister statute to Title IX).
262 See CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1954 (interpreting 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)); GomezPerez, 128 S. Ct. at 1935 (interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 633a(a) (2006)); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173
256 Id.
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protections when examining the First Amendment.263 Although the
Court typically emphasizes strict statutory interpretation and
congressional intent, it broadly interpreted antiretaliation statutory
provisions and examined congressional purpose in both Crawford and
Burlington Northern.264 In Crawford, the Court generously construed
the definition of the word “oppose,”265 while in Burlington Northern
the Court interpreted the phrase “discriminate against” to include
actions taken against employees that are unrelated to employment. 266
Most fundamentally, of course, the Court expanded retaliation
protection in the five statutory cases and greatly restricted it in the
constitutional case.
The recent cases also present numerous surprises when viewed
more broadly against the Court’s nonretaliation cases. First, the
employee won five of the six retaliation cases, a rarity for this Court
that often narrowly construes employee protections in other contexts.
For example, in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,267 the Court
held that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
required a substantially higher causation standard than previously had
been thought to apply.268 Additionally, in the last few years, the Court
severely limited the statute of limitations for discrimination cases,269
restricted the application of the Equal Protection Clause for public
employees,270 and undermined Title VII’s protection from disparate
impact discrimination.271 Although numbers do not tell the whole

(interpreting 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2006)).
263 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006) (“We hold that when public
employees make statements pursuant to their official duties, the employees are not speaking as
citizens for First Amendment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their
communications from employer discipline.”).
264 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 850
(2009) (interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 broadly); Burlington N., 548 U.S.
at 56–57 (same).
265 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 850.
266 Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 56–57.
267 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
268 Id. at 2351–52.
269 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162, 2177–78 (2007)
(holding that any act of unlawful Title VII employment discrimination, including those
involving compensation, must be presented to the EEOC within the period ordered in the
statute, which, in this case, was 180 days), superseded by statute, Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-2, 123 Stat. 5 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)).
270 See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 128 S. Ct. 2146, 2157 (2008) (holding that “class
of one” equal-protection claims are not cognizable in the public-employment context).
271 Ricci v. DeStefano, 129 S. Ct. 2658, 2664 (2009) (holding that a city’s decision to
throw out the results of a firefighter promotion test, which was passed almost exclusively by
whites, was “impermissible under Title VII unless the [city could] demonstrate a strong basis in
evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under [Title VII’s disparatetreatment prohibition]”).
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story,272 the win-loss record for employees in retaliation cases
conflicts with the conventional wisdom that this Court generally
favors business interests in employment cases.273
Second, many of the recent retaliation cases undermine
longstanding Supreme Court precedent. In particular, the implied
retaliation cases ignore the Court’s traditional reluctance to imply a
right of action when a statute does not explicitly provide for one. In
the last few decades, the Supreme Court has limited the ability of
federal courts to imply private rights of action by abandoning inquiry
into a statute’s purpose.274 Rather, federal courts must utilize basic
statutory interpretation tools to examine whether Congress
specifically intended to create a right of action.275
Yet, in the face of this precedent, the Court went out of its way to
permit three claims for retaliation when no antiretaliation provision
existed.276 As mentioned above, although the reliance on Sullivan may
272 See Harkavy, supra note 4, at 2 (“For those who insist on keeping a scorecard,
employees appeared at first blush to fare better this [2007] term than last. Indeed, employees
‘won’ six and ‘lost’ three of the ten decisions pitting them directly against their employers.”);
Shanor, supra note 190, at 154 (“If this is a more conservative Court, it did not show it in
[CBOCS West].”).
273 See, e.g., Christine Cooper, Employment Cases from the 2006–2007 Supreme Court
Term, 23 LAB. LAW. 223, 224 (2008) (“Of course the Court has tilted to the right.”); Ramona L.
Paetzold, Supreme Court’s 2005–2006 Term Employment Law Cases: Do New Justices Imply
New Directions?, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 303, 348 (2006) (noting that after the 2005–
2006 term, “preliminary indicia of a new conservatism do exist”); Michael Selmi, The Supreme
Court’s 2006–2007 Term Employment Law Cases: A Quiet but Revealing Term, 11 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 219, 220 (2007) (“The other patently obvious lesson this [2006–2007] term
provided is that this is a tough time for plaintiffs in the employment context.”); Linda
Greenhouse, Justices Express Skepticism in a Discrimination Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2007,
at A26 (discussing whether the Supreme Court really has “drifted so far toward the employer’s
side in job discrimination cases that it is now to the right of the Bush administration”); see also
Robert Barnes, Term Saw High Court Move to the Right, WASH. POST, July 1, 2009, at A1
(noting after the 2008–2009 term that the Supreme Court’s “path [is] clear: a patient and steady
move to the right led by Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.”).
274 See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (delineating a four factor test for federal courts
to apply when evaluating whether there is a private cause of action implicit in a statute).
275 See, e.g., id. at 78–79 (applying four factors to determine the legislative intent behind a
statute); Karahalios v. Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps., Local 1263, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989)
(“Congress undoubtedly was aware from our cases such as Cort v. Ash that the Court had
departed from its prior standard for resolving a claim urging that an implied statutory cause of
action should be recognized, and that such issues were being resolved by a straightforward
inquiry into whether Congress intended to provide a private cause of action.” (citation omitted));
Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15–16 (1979) (“While some
opinions of the Court have placed considerable emphasis upon the desirability of implying
private rights of action in order to provide remedies thought to effectuate the purposes of a
given statute, what must ultimately be determined is whether Congress intended to create the
private remedy asserted, as our recent decisions have made clear.” (citation omitted)).
276 See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1954 (2008) (holding that 42
U.S.C. § 1981 contains an implicit antiretaliation provision); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct.
1931, 1936 (2008) (holding that the ADEA contains an implicit antiretaliation provision);
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 174 (2005) (holding that Title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972 contains an implicit antiretaliation provision); see also Lynn
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have been appropriate to discern Congressional intent in Jackson, this
rationale loses its force when applied to § 1981 in CBOCS West and
the ADEA in Gomez-Perez. Congress created the statutory language
at issue in both of these later cases during a period when it also
enacted numerous statutes with very specific antiretaliation
provisions. It is unlikely that Congress relied on Sullivan’s vague
holding in 1974 when it enacted the ADEA or in 1991 when it
amended the Civil Rights Act because Congress also included
specific antiretaliation language in other legislation during that
time.277 Moreover, when it enacted the ADEA and the 1991
Amendment’s antidiscrimination language in § 1981, Congress
certainly was aware that the Court required specific language in order
to recognize a private cause of action.278 This legislative reality
significantly undermines the Court’s conclusion that Congress
actually constructed a general antidiscrimination provision without an
antiretaliation clause because it was relying on the Court’s Sullivan
opinion released years before.279 At a minimum, the fact that the
Court’s arguments present substantial problems should make
commentators question why the Court worked so hard to imply rights
of action for retaliation after years of reluctance to do so in any other
case.
Third, for a Supreme Court that prides itself on closely adhering to
statutory language when interpreting the law,280 the recent Title VII
retaliation cases demonstrate the Court’s willingness to examine
congressional purpose in addition to statutory language. For example,
Title VII itself gives little indication as to what exactly it prevents
employers from doing in retaliation: the statute prohibits only

Ridgeway Zehrt, Retaliation’s Changing Landscape, 20 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 143, 179–80
(2010) (discussing the Supreme Court’s revival of implied antiretaliation provisions in civil
rights statutes).
277 See supra notes 171–74, 191–97 and accompanying text.
278 See Karahalios, 489 U.S. at 536 (noting that Congress is aware of the Court’s “straightforward inquiry” standard for determining whether or not a statute contains an implicit private
cause of action).
279 See Harkavy, supra note 4, at 10 (noting in Gomez-Perez the “undeniable anomaly that
Congress provided an express remedy for retaliation against private employees, but did not do
so in similar terms for federal employees”).
280 See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 304 (2006)
(rejecting the respondents’ reliance on a statute’s legislative history as insufficient in the face of
unambiguous text); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 567–71 (2005)
(rejecting the use of other interpretive tools because the statute in question was not ambiguous);
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 359 (2005) (noting that the Court is “not free to rewrite the
statute that Congress has enacted”); see also Humphries v. CBOCS W., Inc., 474 F.3d 387, 410
(7th Cir. 2007) (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting in part) (noting that these cases indicate that the
Supreme Court “insists that statutory language be followed even if inconvenient or jarring”).
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“discrimination.”281 Before Burlington Northern, many lower courts
had held that this provision should be read in pari materia with Title
VII’s antidiscrimination provision; in other words, they both address
the same type of employer action taken towards employees in the
employment setting.282 The Supreme Court, however, refused to
follow this standard canon of statutory interpretation in Burlington
Northern. After a cursory look at the differences between the specific
language in the antidiscrimination provision and the general language
in the antiretaliation provision, the Court felt that Congress’ purpose
when it enacted the antiretaliation provision should guide the
interpretation of the statute.283 Similarly, Title VII’s use of the term
“oppose” does not have any inherent meaning as to the level of action
required to “oppose” unlawful conduct. The Court’s majority and
concurrence in Crawford presented dueling dictionary definitions to
support their respective positions,284 but ultimately each opinion had
to fall back on its own view of the provision’s purpose as well as the
practical consequences of the interpretation of the word it
presented.285
Commentators have had difficulty following the twists and turns.
Some assert that the Court has returned to an earlier era in which its
goal is to divine congressional intent and advance Congress’ purposes
through the Court’s interpretation of statutes.286 Others highlight and
281 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination against an employee because the employee has opposed or accused an employer
with an unlawful employment practice).
282 See, e.g., White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799–800 (6th Cir.
2004) (rejecting the EEOC’s assertion that the court adopt a different definition of “adverse
employment action” only for Title VII retaliation claims); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d
858, 866 (4th Cir. 2001) (noting that to succeed in a Title VII antiretaliation claim, a plaintiff
must show that a sufficient adverse employment action occurred); Robinson v. City of
Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that courts have interpreted Title VII’s
retaliation provision to require that the “alleged retaliation constitute ‘adverse employment
action’” (quoting Williams v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 85 F.3d 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1996))).
283 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 62–64 (2006) (“[P]urpose
reinforces what language already indicates, namely, that the antiretaliation provision, unlike the
substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that affect the terms and
conditions of employment.”).
284 Compare Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct.
846, 850 (2009) (noting that Random House Dictionary defines “oppose” as being “hostile or
adverse to, as in opinion” (internal quotation marks omitted)), with id. at 853–54 (Alito, J.,
concurring in the judgment) (noting that the commonly understood definitions of “oppose”
require active and purposeful conduct).
285 Id. at 852–53 (majority opinion) (rejecting the “active” formulation of “oppose”
because requiring the active definition would ultimately harm employees and encourage silence
in the face of unlawful conduct); id. at 854 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (embracing
the “active” definition of “oppose” for Title VII antiretaliation purposes because otherwise it
“would open the door to retaliation claims by employees who never express a word of
opposition to their employers”).
286 See Derek W. Black, The Mysteriously Reappearing Cause of Action: The Court’s
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analyze the Court’s use of various canons of statutory interpretation
and judicially created legal fictions.287 In a thoughtful article after the
Jackson opinion in 2005, Professor Deborah Brake provided a wellreasoned argument that protection from retaliation was an implied
part of protection from discrimination.288
Other commentators view the decisions as little more than
outcome-driven policy determinations in favor of retaliation
protection; however, they cannot agree on the meaning of the
outcomes.289 For example, Professor Richard Carlson has argued that
the Court’s recent statutory retaliation cases do not necessarily “signal
a consistently sympathetic judicial view” regarding retaliation against
employees, in large part because they all hue closely to specific
statutory language.290 Indeed, he dismissed these cases as “episodic
expressions of support” that “belie a persistent ambivalence” toward
employees who suffer retaliation when they advance the interest of
the larger public good.291 In contrast, Daniel Westman, a prominent
practitioner and author,292 asserted that the Court has been proemployee in retaliation cases because “[j]udges do not like the idea
that witnesses are going to be intimidated and that translates into the
workplace.”293
Perhaps these decisions simply present examples of the Court
deciding only the narrow issues of the cases before it: whether
Expanded Concept of Intentional Gender and Race Discrimination in Federally Funded
Programs, 67 MD. L. REV. 358, 395 (2008) (“[T]he Court recognized a cause of action [in
Jackson] not merely because retaliation might fall within intent, but primarily because allowing
retaliation would undermine Title IX’s purpose.”); cf. Shanor, supra note 190, at 172 (noting
that the Court in CBOCS West and Gomez-Perez “moved away from textual statutory
construction to more contextual or pragmatist approaches to statutory interpretation”).
287 See The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations,
122 HARV. L. REV. 445, 449, 451–55 (2008) (asserting that the opinions in Gomez-Perez use
rhetoric that appears to examine legislative intent, but, that, in reality, utilize judicially created
legal fictions); Zehrt, supra note 276, at 153 (analyzing the three recent implied retaliation cases
and arguing that the court “has eschewed any reliance on public policy and has chosen instead
to base its decisions solely on statutory construction”).
288 See Brake, supra note 7, at 21–22.
289 See The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Leading Cases, Federal Statutes and Regulations,
119 HARV. L. REV. 337, 365 (2005) (“To an optimist, Jackson is a valiant attempt by the
judiciary to patch an unfortunate statutory hole. To a pessimist, the case is a contemptible
example of tenuous reasoning chasing a desired policy outcome . . . .”).
290 Carlson, supra note 7, at 244 (contrasting the pro-employee decisions in Jackson and
Burlington Northern with the pro-employer decision in Garcetti).
291 Id. at 240.
292 See generally WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 119; Daniel P. Westman, MORRISON
& FOERSTER, http://www.mofo.com/daniel-westman (last visited Dec. 21, 2010).
293 Coyle, supra note 4 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Daniel Westman on the
Supreme Court’s recent antiretaliation cases). Of course, Westman’s conclusion does not
explain the Garcetti Court’s reluctance to protect a person who was both an employee and a
witness.
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statutory language contains an implied right of action or covers
certain actions. Admittedly, in each decision, the Court engaged in a
discreet and nuanced examination of the specific statutory language
and structure involved in each individual case. Indeed, to some the
cases required only “careful scrutiny of the particular provision in
question,”294 which would keep with the Court’s historic view
limiting the instances in which it would read a statutory provision
broadly or imbue an implied right of action.
But a more comprehensive explanation exists. Placing these cases
in the context of the Court’s other retaliation jurisprudence provides a
perspective that brings consistency and a sense of order to these
seemingly counterintuitive results. When placed in this context, one
common theme can be discerned throughout the recent retaliation
cases: the Antiretaliation Principle. The Court recognized that
enforcing the law requires encouraging employees to provide
information about employer misconduct. Antiretaliation protection
means enhanced law enforcement, which the Court for fifty years has
valued more than other competing concerns. Indeed, in several ways,
the recent retaliation cases exemplify the Court’s longstanding
acceptance of and adherence to the same Antiretaliation Principle that
the Court has utilized consistently in the past.
As an initial matter, the implied retaliation cases rely heavily on
the holding of Sullivan, a case that, as mentioned above, relies on the
Antiretaliation Principle to support its holding that § 1982
incorporates an implied right of action for retaliation.295 Indeed, all
three of the recent implied-retaliation cases pay homage to Sullivan’s
reference to the Principle.296
But, more than simply adopting Sullivan, the Court reinvigorated
the Antiretaliation Principle through these recent cases. Again, the
Antiretaliation Principle recognizes that law enforcement depends on
employees blowing the whistle on illegal conduct—even if those
employees are not the victims of that conduct. In order to encourage
294 Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1951 (2008) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see
also id. at 1939 (majority opinion) (“Jackson did not hold that Title IX prohibits retaliation
because the Court concluded as a policy matter that such claims are important. Instead, the
holding in Jackson was based on an interpretation of the ‘text of Title IX.’” (quoting Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 178 (2005))).
295 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (finding that if an
individual could be “punished for trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected by
§ 1982,” then “[s]uch a sanction would give impetus to the perpetuation of racial restrictions on
property”); see also discussion supra Part I.
296 See CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951, 1955 (2008) (beginning its
interpretation with a discussion of Sullivan); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1936 (applying the
reasoning of Sullivan to the ADEA); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180 (“Sullivan made clear that
retaliation claims extend to those who oppose discrimination against others.”).
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them to come forward, the law must protect them from retaliation.
Notably, like Sullivan, two of the three recent implied retaliation
cases—Jackson and CBOCS West—involved third-party reporters of
illegal discrimination.297 The Jackson plaintiff reported inequities in
the girls’ basketball program298 and the CBOCS West plaintiff
reported alleged discrimination against a coworker.299 The Jackson
Court made it clear that the victim of retaliation can be (and often
would be) different than the victim of the underlying
discrimination.300 For Title IX specifically, the Court found that Title
IX’s enforcement depended on complaints, particularly from insiders
with firsthand knowledge about violations, such as teachers and
coaches.301
Thus, the Jackson Court explicitly adopted the Antiretaliation
Principle:
If recipients [of federal education funds] were permitted to
retaliate freely, individuals who witness discrimination would
be loath to report it, and all manner of Title IX violations
might go unremedied as a result.
Reporting incidents of discrimination is integral to Title IX
enforcement and would be discouraged if retaliation against
those who report went unpunished. Indeed, if retaliation were
not prohibited, Title IX’s enforcement scheme would
unravel. . . . Without protection from retaliation, individuals
who witness discrimination would likely not report it . . . and
the underlying discrimination would go unremedied.302
This adoption paved the way for the subsequent implied-retaliation
cases to do the same for similar reasons. The CBOCS West Court
upheld a retaliation claim for § 1981 in part because its sister statute,
297 CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1954 (involving an assistant manager who was fired after
complaining about the race-based discharge of a fellow employee); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171
(involving a male coach and gym teacher who complained about the girls’ basketball team
receiving unequal access to athletic facilities and funding); Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 234–37
(involving the claim of Sullivan, a white man, who was expelled from his homeowners’
corporation for leasing his property to a black man and advocating against racial
discrimination).
298 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 171.
299 CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1954.
300 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179–80.
301 Id. at 181 (“[T]eachers and coaches such as Jackson are often in the best position to
vindicate the rights of their students because they are better able to identify discrimination and
bring it to the attention of administrators. Indeed, sometimes adult employees are ‘the only
effective adversar[ies]’ of discrimination in schools.” (alteration in original) (quoting Sullivan,
396 U.S. at 237)).
302 Id. at 180–81 (citation omitted).
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§ 1982, was held by Sullivan to provide “protection from retaliation
for reasons related to the enforcement of the express statutory
right.”303 Although the Antiretaliation Principle is not as explicit in
Gomez-Perez,304 the Court did reject the government employer’s
argument that protection from retaliation was not necessary because
third parties were not required to identify age discrimination and
report it.305
The Title VII cases also advanced the Antiretaliation Principle by
broadly interpreting the statute’s express antiretaliation provision.
First, in Burlington Northern, the Court reiterated that Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision prevents employers “from interfering
(through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or advance
enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”306 In short, the “primary
purpose” of the provision is to maintain “unfettered access to
statutory remedial mechanisms.”307 Because of this purpose, the Court
held that the provision should be interpreted broadly so that
employers would be deterred from retaliating against employees who
might report wrongdoing.308 Citing back to the Court’s first
expression of the Antiretaliation Principle, the Court in Burlington
Northern explicitly relied on the Principle again:
Title VII depends for its enforcement upon the cooperation of
employees who are willing to file complaints and act as
witnesses. “Plainly, effective enforcement could thus only be
expected if employees felt free to approach officials with
their grievances.” Interpreting the antiretaliation provision to
provide broad protection from retaliation helps ensure the
cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary
objective depends.309

303 CBOCS

W., 128 S. Ct. at 1958.
Gomez-Perez Court explicitly denied that it had made a policy-oriented
determination in Jackson, even though the Jackson Court had discussed the important role of
teachers and students in reporting illegal discrimination. Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct.
1931, 1938–39 (2008). The Court claimed that the Jackson Court’s discussion of this topic was
merely in response to the Birmingham School Board’s argument that even if Title IX permitted
some antiretaliation claims, only the actual victims of sex discrimination—and not reporting
third parties—should be able to institute a claim. Id. at 1939.
305 Id. at 1938–39.
306 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006).
307 Id. at 64 (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
308 Id. at 67.
309 Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288,
292 (1960)).
304 The
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Even when the Court declined to consider “petty slights, minor
annoyances, and simple lack of good manners” to be actionable
retaliation, the Antiretaliation Principle guided the Court’s
rationale.310 Allowing such de minimis harms would not prevent
“unfettered access” to Title VII’s remedial mechanisms because those
trivial acts would not reasonably deter an employee from reporting
discrimination.311 By focusing on the Antiretaliation Principle—i.e.,
enhancing law enforcement by encouraging employees to blow the
whistle on illegalities—the Court limited actionable retaliatory acts to
those that “could well dissuade a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”312
The Court even modified its seemingly objective perspective on
which actions would be “material.” By permitting some attention to
be paid to whether an action would dissuade “a reasonable person in
the plaintiff’s position,”313 the Court allowed for the introduction of
individualized factors that might dissuade one type of person but not
another from reporting. This subjectivity highlights the importance of
encouraging employees to report misconduct. Ultimately, although
the Court wanted to “screen out trivial conduct,” its focus was on the
Antiretaliation Principle: preventing “those acts that are likely to
dissuade employees from complaining or assisting in complaints
about discrimination.”314
Crawford, the second Title VII case, also emphasized the
importance of the Antiretaliation Principle through the Court’s
recognition of the important role employee whistleblowers play in
enforcing Title VII. As in Sullivan, Jackson, and CBOCS West, the
plaintiff in Crawford was more of a reporter of discrimination than a
victim asserting her own rights.315 Indeed, the Crawford Court made
explicit its understanding that employees who report discrimination
against others may face retaliation even when the whistleblower was
not personally discriminated against.316

310 Id.

at 68.
(quoting Robinson, 519 U.S. at 346) (internal quotation marks omitted).
312 Id. at 57; see also id. at 68–69 (discussing the incentives created by the antiretaliation
principle).
313 Id. at 69–70.
314 Id. at 70.
315 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 849.
(2009). Although the plaintiff in Crawford actually was a victim of sexual harassment, she is
more of a “reporter” of discrimination because she informed her employer about the sexually
harassing conduct only in direct response to an employer-instigated investigation. Id.
316 Id. at 853 n.3 (“[E]mployees will often face retaliation not for opposing discrimination
they themselves face, but for reporting discrimination suffered by others. Thus, they are not
‘victims’ of anything until they are retaliated against . . . .”).
311 Id.
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After its discussion of various dictionary meanings of the word
“oppose,” the Crawford Court focused on the primary policy
justification for protecting employees who participate in internal
corporate investigations. This policy rationale involved yet another
restatement of the Antiretaliation Principle:
If it were clear law that an employee who reported
discrimination in answering an employer’s questions could be
penalized with no remedy, prudent employees would have a
good reason to keep quiet about Title VII offenses against
themselves or against others. This is no imaginary horrible
given the documented indications that “[f]ear of retaliation is
the leading reason why people stay silent instead of voicing
their concerns about bias and discrimination.”317
Therefore, the five recent statutory retaliation cases reflect the same
three premises supporting the Antiretaliation Principle that the Court
has utilized for almost fifty years. First, the Court recognized that
employees often have the best information about wrongdoing
committed by an employer—a fact underscored by the plaintiffs in
those cases, two of whom reported illegal conduct that was not
directed at them.318 Second, as Crawford, Burlington Northern, and
Jackson all explicitly recognized, employees will come forward with
this inside information only if they are protected from retaliation.319
Third, as Crawford, Burlington Northern, and Jackson made clear,
effective law enforcement requires employees to report illegal
conduct.320
This theory explains these five recent statutory cases better than
focusing solely on an argument that retaliation is another form of
discrimination.321 Granted, language in the implied retaliation cases
supports this position, particularly in Jackson, where the majority
317 Id.

at 852 (alternation in original) (quoting Brake, supra note 7, at 20).
CBOCS W., Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1931, 1954 (2008); Jackson v.
Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167, 181 (2005). Moreover, in Crawford, the plaintiff was a
victim of discrimination but reported the discrimination only during a general investigation
conducted by her employer. Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 849.
319 Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53,
67 (2005); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180–81.
320 See Crawford, 129 S. Ct. at 852; (discussing how reporting illegal conduct is an
incentive for employers to stop discriminatory behavior); Burlington N., 548 U.S. at 68
(suggesting that absent antiretaliation laws, employers will interfere with employees’ legally
protected remedies); Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180–81; (“If recipients were able to avoid such notice
by retaliating against all those who dare to complain, the statute’s enforcement scheme would be
subverted.”).
321 But see Brake, supra note 7, at 21–22 (arguing that the recognition of “retaliation” as a
form of “discrimination” is an important and necessary step in legal theory).
318 See
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makes this “retaliation equals discrimination” argument explicitly.322
This rationale, however, does not explain Congress’ frequent practice
of providing separate protection from retaliation in antidiscrimination
laws.323 Nor does it provide insight for interpreting antiretaliation
provisions in laws addressing problems other than discrimination.324
Put another way: for a law to be enforced, whether it is a law against
discrimination or otherwise, retaliation against those who report
violations must be prevented.
Framed in this manner, retaliation law is not limited by its
association with discrimination; rather, discrimination law is merely
one area in which antiretaliation protection is needed in order to
enforce the law. Viewed from this perspective, Jackson, CBOCS
West, and Gomez-Perez do not mean that the Court will imply
retaliation protection only in discrimination cases. Instead, they could
be interpreted to mean that discrimination claims present only one
example of the types of claims that also need antiretaliation protection
in order to be effectively enforced.
Of course, the Court’s further focus on retaliation in the Title VII
discrimination context merely provides another example of a law in
which retaliation protection is required for the law’s enforcement. In
those cases, however, the protection was explicit rather than implicit,
and the issues involved how broadly that protection should be read.
Moreover, in the context of the Court’s other retaliation
jurisprudence, the Court’s recent statements related to the broader
Antiretaliation Principle become meaningful. Over the course of the
last fifty years, the Court has made these same types of statements in
cases involving a variety of topics in addition to discrimination. As
noted above, the Court utilized the Principle by upholding broad
retaliation protection in cases involving the First Amendment,325 wage
claims,326
labor
relations,327
nuclear-environmental
safety
322 Jackson, 544 U.S. at 174; see CBOCS W., 128 S. Ct. at 1960–61 (rejecting the dissent’s
argument that retaliation and discrimination are distinct); Gomez-Perez, 128 S. Ct. at 1937
(noting that in Jackson, the dissent’s argument in favor of distinct categories for “retaliation”
and “discrimination” did not succeed).
323 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(2006); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006).
324 See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006);
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11(c), 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006).
325 See Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (holding that school teachers
should be able to speak freely about matters of public concern without fear of retaliation).
326 See Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292–93 (1960) (holding
that employers may not retaliate against employees who lawfully complain about substandard
working conditions, and that employees who are fired for their lawful complaints are entitled to
back wages).
327 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895–96 (1984) (holding that an employer’s
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regulations,328 transportation-industry rules,329 and witness
testimony.330 The Court’s protection of whistleblowers goes well
beyond those who report only discrimination. In each of those
instances, the Court’s rationale relates to the importance of these
employees’ reports for law-enforcement efforts more generally.
In seeming juxtaposition to the approach the Court took in the
statutory cases, the result in the lone First Amendment decision
substantially narrowed retaliation protection. Indeed, the Court’s 2006
decision in Garcetti v. Ceballos provided the first example of the
Court denying First Amendment protection to an employee who
complained about arguably illegal conduct.331 As noted above,
although the employee’s speech (the complaint about governmental
misconduct) related to a “matter of public concern” (the possible
existence of governmental misconduct in the Los Angeles County
District Attorney’s Office), the Court held that the First Amendment
did not protect the employee from retaliation because the speech was
made pursuant to his official duties.332
To a limited degree, however, Garcetti provides yet another
example of the Court explaining antiretaliation protection through the
lens of the Antiretaliation Principle. At the same time that the Court
implemented a rule that undermined the Principle, the Garcetti Court
also made explicit statements in support of the Principle. For
example, the Court identified the importance of balancing the

reporting of an illegal alien employee to the INS, in direct retaliation for that employee’s joining
of a labor union, constitutes unlawful employer conduct under the National Labor Relations
Act); Bill Johnson’s Rests., Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 744 (1983) (holding that it is an
unlawful labor practice for employers to prosecute baseless, intentionally retaliatory lawsuits
against employees who are availing themselves of the National Labor Relations Act, and that
such lawsuits may be enjoined); NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121–22, 125 (1972) (holding
that it is a violation of the National Labor Relations Act for an employer to fire an employee
because the employee gave sworn, written statements to the NLRB).
328 See English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 90 (1990) (holding that the Energy
Reorganization Act of 1974, which prohibits retaliation by a nuclear industry employer against
employees who report nuclear safety violations, does not forbid employees from seeking statelaw remedies for alleged employer retaliation).
329 See Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 248 (1994) (holding that the
Railway Labor Act does not preempt the state-law wrongful-discharge claim of an aircraft
mechanic who reported his safety concerns to the Federal Aviation Administration); Brock v.
Roadway Express, Inc., 481 U.S. 252, 258–59 (1987) (Marshall, J., plurality opinion)
(discussing that the purpose behind section 405 of the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of
1982 was to provide significant antiretaliation protections to transportation industry workers
because of their knowledge of an employer’s motor vehicle safety violations).
330 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125–27 (1998) (holding that an at-will employee
may file a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) if the employee is fired to deter him
from testifying at an upcoming federal criminal trial).
331 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2006).
332 Id. at 413–15, 419–22.
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employee and employer interests with the “public’s interest in
receiving the well-informed views of government employees
engaging in civic discussion.”333
That said, the Court seems to have strayed from the Antiretaliation
Principle in Garcetti because, despite giving lip service to the
importance of society’s interest in employee speech,334 it heavily
weighted the government’s need for managerial control over its
workforce and provided no actual discussion of the weight to be given
to society’s specific interest in law enforcement.335
The Antiretaliation Principle normally would call for the
protection of an employee who reports illegal conduct, even if that
reporting was part of the employee’s job duties. Job duties would
make no doctrinal difference if the Court is truly focused on the
Antiretaliation Principle in the decision. A rule that is more consistent
with the Principle articulated in the rest of the Court’s retaliation
jurisprudence would recognize that speech related to illegal
government conduct lies at the heart of First Amendment protection.
Society’s interest in knowing about the government’s unlawful
behavior should be weighed heavily in favor of protection from
retaliation, particularly because, like the other contexts discussed
above, government employees have unique access to information
about illegalities.
In his dissent in Garcetti, Justice Souter set out a rule that more
appropriately incorporates the Antiretaliation Principle into the
Court’s Pickering balancing. Justice Souter argued, “private and
public interests in addressing official wrongdoing and threats to
health and safety can outweigh the government [employer]’s stake in
effective implementation of policy.”336 When employee speech relates
to job duties, typically the government’s need for managerial
authority would outweigh the First Amendment interests at stake.337
According to Justice Souter, however, when the employee “speaks on
333 Id. at 419; see also id. at 420 (“The [Supreme] Court’s decisions . . . have sought both
to promote the individual and societal interests that are served when employees speak as citizens
on matters of public concern and to respect the needs of government employers attempting to
perform their important public functions.”); cf. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82
(2004) (per curiam) (“Were [public employees] not able to speak on [the operations of their
employers], the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues.
The interest at stake is as much the public’s interest in receiving informed opinion as it is the
employee’s own right to disseminate it.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Nat’l Treasury
Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 470 (1995) (“The large-scale disincentive to Government
employees’ expression also imposes a significant burden on the public’s right to read and hear
what the employees would otherwise have written and said.”).
334 Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 419–20.
335 Id. at 422–23.
336 Id. at 428 (Souter, J., dissenting).
337 Id. at 435.
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a matter of unusual importance and satisfies high standards of
responsibility in the way he does it,” then the employee should be
protected under the First Amendment.338 Justice Souter defined “a
matter of unusual importance” to include speech related to “official
dishonesty, deliberately unconstitutional action, other serious
wrongdoing, or threats to health and safety.”339 His examples of such
speech relate to reports of illegal conduct, including when “a public
auditor speaks on his discovery of embezzlement of public funds,
when a building inspector makes an obligatory report of an attempt to
bribe him, or when a law enforcement officer expressly balks at a
superior’s order to violate constitutional rights he is sworn to
protect.”340 In other words, Justice Souter agreed with the job-duty
rule generally, but understood it should be limited because of the
Antiretaliation Principle’s protection of speech related to law
enforcement, even if the speech was part of one’s job duty. Justice
Souter’s exception for employee reports of illegal government
behavior would better comply with the Court’s long history of
support for the Antiretaliation Principle.
Importantly, Garcetti ultimately confirms the Court’s belief that
the Antiretaliation Principle should be implemented by Congress,
instead of by the Court through constitutional interpretation. One of
the reasons the Court offered to support its Garcetti holding was that
there existed a “powerful network of legislative enactments—such as
whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes—available to those
who seek to expose wrongdoing.”341
Indeed, the Court has used a similar justification for reduced First
Amendment protection in the employment setting. In Waters v.
Churchill,342 the Court noted in a plurality opinion authored by Justice
O’Connor that legislatures could extend stronger antiretaliation
protections to their employees “beyond what is mandated by the First
Amendment, out of respect for the values underlying the First
Amendment, values central to our social order as well as our legal
system.”343 Also, in Bush v. Lucas,344 the Court specifically denied a
First Amendment damages claim to federal employees because
Congress had created statutory protections from retaliation under the
Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.345 Thus, the constitutional cases
338 Id.
339 Id.
340 Id.

at 433.
at 425 (majority opinion).
342 511 U.S. 661 (1994).
343 Id. at 674 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion).
344 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
345 Id. at 389 (“In the past [Congress] has demonstrated its awareness that lower-level
341 Id.
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linguistically support the Antiretaliation Principle, but they also often
demonstrate the Court’s understanding that it is primarily a statutory,
not a constitutional, principle.
In sum, all the recent retaliation cases demonstrate that the
Supreme Court’s retaliation jurisprudence is about law enforcement.
Employees must be protected from retaliation so that they will report
illegal conduct. These employee reports will themselves aid law
enforcement by alerting authorities to wrongdoing. As important, the
threat of possible employee reports will deter employer violations in
the first place. That being said, the Garcetti opinion seems to confirm
the Court’s longstanding view that this antiretaliation protection more
appropriately arises out of statutory, rather than constitutional, law.
III. THE FUTURE
Identifying and explaining the Supreme Court’s rationale in
retaliation cases should impact how the Supreme Court and lower
courts approach retaliation law in the future.
A. The Supreme Court
First, and most immediately, the Supreme Court appears interested
in continuing its recent examination of retaliation law. The Court
recently granted certiorari in two more statutory retaliation cases:
Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp. and Thompson v.
North American Stainless, LP. The Antiretaliation Principle could
directly influence the outcome of these important cases.
Kasten involves the question of whether the Fair Labor Standard
Act’s antiretaliation provision protects an employee who files an oral
complaint that an employer violated the FLSA.346 In the lower courts,
the case turned on how to interpret the FLSA’s protection of an
employee who “has filed any complaint.”347 Both the district court
and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that this statutory
language protects only a written complaint, not an oral complaint.348

Government employees are a valuable source of information, and that supervisors might
improperly attempt to curtail their subordinates’ freedom of expression.”).
346 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 14, at i.
347 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3) (2006); see Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
570 F.3d 834, 837–40 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010); Kasten v. SaintGobain Performance Plastics Corp., 619 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611–12 (W.D. Wis. 2008), aff’d, 570
F.3d 834 (7th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010).
348 Kasten, 570 F.3d at 840; Kasten, 619 F. Supp. 2d at 613.
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Decisions by several other circuit courts, however, have protected
employees who made oral complaints about FLSA violations.349
Thompson examines whether Title VII prohibits retaliation against
an employee by “inflicting reprisals” on a third party who is closely
related to the employee.350 In this case, the plaintiff alleges that he
was fired because his fiancée engaged in conduct protected by Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision.351 The District Court for the Eastern
District of Kentucky entered summary judgment in favor of the
employer, concluding that Title VII “by its plain language does not
permit third party retaliation claims.”352 A panel of the Sixth Circuit
reversed,353 but then a divided en banc circuit court overturned the
panel’s decision.354 The majority pointed out that Title VII’s
retaliation provision prohibits discrimination against an employee
“because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.”355 Relying on what it
viewed to be the “plain and unambiguous statutory text” of Title VII’s
retaliation provision, the court found that Title VII protects only
individuals who themselves engaged in protected conduct.356 Because
Thompson did not engage in the protected conduct himself, the
majority ruled that he could not bring a retaliation claim for his own
discharge.357
At first glance, both cases present relatively pedestrian statutoryinterpretation issues. In Kasten, the Court must decide between
349 E.g., EEOC v. Romeo Cmty. Sch., 976 F.2d 985, 989–90 (6th Cir. 1992); EEOC v.
White & Son Enters., 881 F.2d 1006, 1011–12 (11th Cir. 1989); Brock v. Richardson, 812 F.2d
121, 125 (3d Cir. 1987).
350 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 16, at i.
351 See id. at 3 (alleging that Thompson, the plaintiff, was fired because his fiancée, who
also worked for the defendant, had filed a charge of sex discrimination with the EEOC).
352 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 435 F. Supp. 2d 633, 639 (E.D. Ky. 2006), aff’d en
banc, 567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (2010).
353 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 520 F.3d 644, 650 (6th Cir. 2008), rev’d en banc,
567 F.3d 804 (6th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542.
354 Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 567 F.3d 804, 816 (6th Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert.
granted, 130 S. Ct. 3542. Nine judges joined in the majority opinion, one judge delivered a
separate concurrence in the result, and six judges filed a total of three dissenting opinions. Id. at
805; id. at 816 (Rogers, J., concurring in the result); id. at 818 (Martin, J., dissenting); id. at 820
(Moore, J., dissenting); id. at 826 (White, J., dissenting).
355 Id. at 807 (majority opinion) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
356 Id. at 805.
357 See id. at 808 (“By application of the plain language of the statute, [the plaintiff] is not
included in the class of persons for whom Congress created a retaliation cause of action because
he personally did not oppose an unlawful employment practice, make a charge, testify, assist, or
participate in an investigation.”).
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competing interpretations of the statutory terms “file” and
“complaint.” In their briefs, the two sides each offered several
dictionary definitions of the terms to support their arguments. 358
Moreover, each side presented the Court with language from
numerous other statutes that support its position regarding the scope
of the provision’s protection.359
Similarly, Thompson ostensibly presents two competing
interpretative views of Title VII’s language. As the Sixth Circuit and
other circuits have found, Title VII’s retaliation provision focuses on
discrimination against the person (“he”) who has opposed unlawful
activity or participated in Title VII activities.360 Another interpretation
of Title VII’s “plain language,” however, could lead to a dramatically
different result.
In her dissenting opinion in Thompson, Judge White noted that
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision merely describes an “unlawful
employment practice”361 and does not identify who receives
protection from such practices.362 Instead, according to Judge White,
Title VII answers that second question in a different section, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b), which provides that any person who claims to
be “aggrieved” by an employer’s unlawful employment practice can
file a claim with the EEOC.363 Additionally, § 2000e-5(f)(1) permits
358 Petitioner’s Brief at 22 nn.10–11, Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.,
130 S. Ct. 1890 (June 16, 2010) (No. 09-834), 2010 WL 2481867 (using a number of
dictionaries to define the phrase “to file”); Brief for Respondent at 19–20, Kasten, 130 S. Ct.
1890 (Aug. 16, 2010) (No. 09-834), 2010 WL 3251632 (using various dictionaries to define
“file” and “complaint”).
359 See Petitioner’s Brief, supra note 358, at 24–30; Brief for Respondent, supra note 358,
at 12, 34–36.
360 See, e.g., Thompson, 567 F.3d at 807–08 (declining to create a cause of action under
Title VII for retaliation against third parties who had not engaged in statutorily protected
activity); Fogelman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568 (3d Cir. 2002) (analyzing similar
language in the ADA and ADEA, and concluding that “the statutes are unambiguous—indeed, it
is hard to imagine a clearer way of specifying that the individual who was discriminated against
must also be the individual who engaged in protected activity”); Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc.,
151 F.3d 813, 819 (8th Cir. 1998) (looking to “plain language” of Title VII to conclude that
plaintiffs who bring antiretaliation claims must have personally engaged in protected conduct);
Holt v. JTM Indus., Inc., 89 F.3d 1224, 1226 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that under the “plain
language” of the ADEA, plaintiffs may file antiretaliation suits only if they have faced
discrimination for personally engaging in protected activity).
361 Thompson, 567 F.3d at 827 (White, J., dissenting).
362 Id. (“Because the language of § 704(a) addresses what is forbidden, rather than who is
protected, the majority must make an inference to reach its conclusion that § 704(a) tells us who
is and is not protected against the actions it prohibits, and then, more importantly, deduce from
that inference who may and may not maintain a cause of action.”).
363 Id. at 828. Interestingly, Judge Rogers’s concurrence reached a conclusion similar to
Judge White’s about the relationship between § 2000e-3 and § 2000e-5(b), but Rogers
interpreted § 2000e-5(b) to permit only “those persons who are the intended beneficiaries” of
Title VII to bring claims, which he declared did not include third parties. Id. at 817 (Rogers, J.,
concurring in the result).
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lawsuits to be filed “by the person claiming to be aggrieved.”364 Thus,
under this analysis, North American Stainless committed an unlawful
employment practice by retaliating against Thompson’s fiancée
through its firing of Thompson.365 Because Thompson was
“aggrieved” by this act, § 2000e-5 permits Thompson to file a claim
against North American Stainless.366 In his Supreme Court brief,
Thompson has adopted this statutory argument as his primary
rationale for overturning the Sixth Circuit’s decision.367
In short, as with the other recent retaliation cases, both Kasten and
Thompson will require the Court to choose between strong linguistic
and statutory interpretation arguments on either side.368 Despite the
claims of judges and advocates on either side of these debates, the
“plain language” of the FLSA and Title VII simply do not answer the
questions these cases present. Ultimately, then, the Antiretaliation
Principle may tip the balance, as it did in Jackson, Burlington
Northern, CBOCS West, Gomez-Perez, and Crawford, in which
similarly strong interpretative arguments could be made regarding the
applicability of retaliation protection. As in those cases, older
retaliation precedent examining the purpose of antiretaliation
protections should loom large.
With regard to Kasten, the Supreme Court stated fifty years ago
that, consistent with the Antiretaliation Principle, the purpose of the
FLSA’s antiretaliation provision was to encourage employees to
report violations of the law:
364 42

U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
567 F.3d at 827–28 (White, J., dissenting) (concluding that an employer can
commit an unlawful employment practice against an opposing employee by firing that
employee’s coemployee, fiancé(e), or spouse in retaliation).
366 Id. at 828–29.
367 Brief for Petitioner at 7–9, Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 130 S. Ct. 3542 (Sept. 3,
2010) (No. 09-291), 2010 WL 3501186. Interestingly, the courts that upheld third-party claims
prior to Thompson typically ignored this type of statutory argument and, instead, relied on an
analysis of the broad purposes behind antiretaliation provisions. See, e.g., McDonnell v.
Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 262 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[A] literal interpretation of [Title VII’s
antiretaliation provision] would leave a gaping hole in the protection of complainants and
witnesses.”); Fitzgerald v. Codex Corp., 882 F.2d 586, 589 (1st Cir. 1989) (upholding a thirdparty retaliation claim under ERISA because a more narrow construction would “clash[] against
the congressional intent of protecting participants and beneficiaries in the exercise of rights
under an ERISA plan”); NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088–89 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding that the NLRA prohibited retaliation against third parties because, without such
protection, covered employees would remain silent out of fear that their employer would seek
revenge against their coemployee relatives); De Medina v. Reinhardt, 444 F. Supp. 573, 580
(D.D.C. 1978) (noting that failing to protect a third party under Title VII would produce “absurd
and unjust results”); see also John J. Feeney, Comment, An Inevitable Progression in the Scope
of Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation Provision: Third-Party Retaliation Claims, 38 CAP. U. L. REV.
643, 655 (2010) (discussing the EEOC’s support for third-party retaliation claims under Title
VII).
368 See discussion supra Part II.A.
365 Thompson,
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For weighty practical and other reasons, Congress did not
seek to secure compliance with prescribed standards through
continuing detailed federal supervision or inspection of
payrolls. Rather it chose to rely on information and
complaints received from employees seeking to vindicate
rights claimed to have been denied. . . . By the proscription of
retaliatory acts . . . Congress sought to foster a climate in
which compliance with the substantive provisions of the
[FLSA] would be enhanced.369
Enforcement of the law requires employees to report FLSA
violations, which necessitates broad antiretaliation protection.370
Moreover, in NLRB v. Scrivener, decided almost forty years ago,
the Court relied upon the Principle to interpret a similar provision of
the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to protect employees who
gave informal statements to investigators, even though the NLRA’s
plain language seemed to narrowly limit protection only to employees
who “[have] filed charges or given testimony.” 371 The Scrivener
Court decided to do exactly what the employee in Kasten asks the
Court to do now: understand the importance of protecting employees
during all phases of the enforcement process, including the initial
report of illegality, and, therefore, to look beyond the statute’s plain,
but limited, language.372
Additionally, failing to protect oral complaints could significantly
impact the effectiveness of a decade-long attempt to encourage
employees to report illegal conduct through the use of employee
hotlines.373 This recent trend involves employers providing employees
a consistent way to make internal complaints about illegal
behavior.374 As two prominent academics have noted, “[I]f internal
369 Mitchell

v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960).
id. (noting that effective enforcement requires that employees feel free to report
grievances to officials).
371 NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 122 (1972) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (1970))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
372 Id. at 124 (“It would make less than complete sense to protect the employee because he
participates in the formal inception of the process (by filing a charge) or the in the final, formal
presentation, but not to protect his participation in the important developmental stages that fall
between these two points in time.”).
373 See Richard E. Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Structural Model to Encourage Corporate
Whistleblowers, 2006 BYU L. REV. 1107, 1138–41 (2006) (analyzing the ability of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Structural Model to encourage and protect corporate employee whistleblowers).
374 See id. (describing the specific methods through which Sarbanes-Oxley allows for more
employee whistleblowing); see also Terry Morehead Dworkin & Elletta Sangrey Callahan,
Internal Whistleblowing: Protecting the Interests of the Employee, the Organization, and
Society, 29 AM. BUS. L.J. 267, 281 (1991) (noting that courts recognize that employees who
discover health and safety violations are likely to first notify management of these problems).
370 See
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disclosures are not protected, reporting of wrongdoing would be
reduced as unaddressed retaliation deters potential whistleblowers and
leads to the laws not being as effectively enforced.”375 Indeed,
protecting oral internal reports makes sense if the goal is to increase
reporting. Social science studies, for example, suggest that most
reports of wrongdoing begin as internal reports.376 The Supreme
Court has been protective of internal reports as well. In addition to
Crawford, which focused on the issue,377 the Court has noted in the
constitutional context that the First Amendment protects internal
reports as well as external whistleblowing.378 In fact, federal courts
and the Secretary of Labor have interpreted other statutes to protect
internal whistleblowers, even when the statute’s language appears to
protect only external whistleblowers.379
More specifically, providing methods to orally report wrongdoing
has become part of the law-enforcement landscape that encourages
internal reporting of wrongdoing.380 Congress and administrative
agencies have required companies to provide employees a means to
report illegal conduct.381 Indeed, most companies, spurred by these
laws and court rulings, provide telephone hotlines for employees to
orally report a broad range of wrongdoing, including both illegal and
unethical conduct.382 Thus, it no longer makes sense (if it ever did) to
think only about protecting the formal initiation of a complaint
375 Dworkin

& Callahan, supra note 374, at 281.
id. at 299 (noting that in the context of sociopsychological research, internal
whistleblowing is preferable to external reporting); Moberly, supra note 373, at 1142
(discussing how employees prefer internal reporting to external reporting as a way to preserve
and demonstrate employer loyalty).
377 Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 849
(2009) (holding that an employee may receive Title VII antiretaliation protection when
reporting discrimination, not on her own initiative, but during an employer’s internal
investigation).
378 See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 420 (2006) (“Employees in some cases may
receive First Amendment protection for expressions made at work.”); Givhan v. W. Line
Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979) (“The First Amendment forbids abridgment of
the ‘freedom of speech.’ Neither the Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that this
freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate privately with his
employer rather than to spread his views before the public. We decline to adopt such a view of
the First Amendment.”).
379 See, e.g., Passaic Valley Sewerage Comm’rs v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 992 F.2d 474,
478–479 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that the Clean Water Act’s antiretaliation protections apply to
employees who make internal complaints to their employers); KOHN, supra note 26, at 251
(noting that the Secretary of Labor “adheres to its longstanding doctrine that internal
whistleblowing is fully protected” in environmental and nuclear whistleblowers cases).
380 See Moberly, supra note 373, at 1138–41, 1151 (discussing how the Sarbanes-Oxley
Structural Model encourages internal whistleblowing).
381 See Moberly, supra note 131, at 988–95 (describing the evolution of corporate codes of
business conduct, and how and why these codes provide employee antiretaliation protections).
382 See id. at 1030 (noting, in response to Sarbanes-Oxley, many companies publicly post
the phone number for their respective whistleblower hotlines).
376 See
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directly with a law-enforcement agency. In fact, the Seventh Circuit
itself recognized this reality in Kasten by noting that, despite the
FLSA’s language, written complaints to an employer (as opposed to
only the government) would constitute protected conduct.383 The
circuit court did not draw a distinction between internal and external
complaints; rather, the court distinguished between written and oral
complaints to an employer.
The Supreme Court, however, has never been interested in such
nuanced and nitpicky distinctions when evaluating antiretaliation
provisions, particularly in older retaliation statutes, because such
distinctions undermine enforcement of the law.384 Given the increased
importance of internal reporting, and the encouragement of oral
internal reporting through the pervasive use of employee hotlines, the
Court would severely hamper FLSA law-enforcement efforts if it
decided in Kasten to deny antiretaliation protection to employees who
make oral reports. The FLSA, in particular, depends heavily on
employee reports for its enforcement,385 and an employee can play an
essential part in the Act’s enforcement through oral as well as written
action.386 For example, the Department of Labor advertises a phone
number for employees to call with concerns about FLSA violations,
thereby explicitly encouraging oral reports and complaints.387
383 Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 570 F.3d 834, 837–38 (7th Cir.
2009), cert granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010).
384 As the Court noted in NLRB v. Scrivener:
An employee who participates in a Board investigation may not be called
formally to testify or may be discharged before any hearing at which he could testify.
His contribution might be merely cumulative or the case may be settled or dismissed
before hearing. Which employees receive statutory protection should not turn on the
vagaries of the selection process or on other events that have no relation to the need
for protection. It would make less than complete sense to protect the employee
because he participates in the formal inception of the process (by filing a charge) or
in the final, formal presentation, but not to protect his participation in the important
developmental stages that fall between these two points in time. This would be
unequal and inconsistent protection and is not the protection needed to preserve the
integrity of the Board process in its entirety.
405 U.S. 117, 123–24 (1972); see also Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson
Cnty., Tenn., 129 S. Ct. 846, 851 (2009) (broadly construing the “opposition” clause of Title
VII’s antiretaliation provision to include an employee’s participation in an employer’s internal
investigation).
385 See Mitchell v. Robert De Mario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288, 292 (1960) (describing
Congress’ purposeful reliance on employee complaints to ensure effective enforcement of the
FLSA).
386 See Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp., 585 F.3d 310, 317 (7th Cir.
2009) (Rovner, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc) (“Oral inquiries, protests,
and information supplied to an agency representative play no less an important role in the
statutory scheme than do letters, e-mails, and sworn statements. They must be protected as
well.”), cert granted, 130 S. Ct. 1890 (2010).
387 The Wage and Hour Division call center phone number is displayed on the U.S.
Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division’s website and on posters that are legally required
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The Sixth Circuit’s cramped reading of Title VII in Thompson will
also undermine law enforcement (and thus the Supreme Court’s
Antiretaliation Principle). During the past half century, the Court
consistently has permitted a wide range of plaintiffs to bring
retaliation lawsuits because of the devastating “chilling” effect
retaliation can have on future employer misconduct reports. Most
obviously, as noted above,388 the Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell
Oil Co. relied on the purpose behind Title VII’s retaliation provision
to conclude that the statute protected former employees as well as
current employees.389 Without this protection, the Supreme Court
recognized that victims of discrimination would be deterred from
complaining to the EEOC.390
In fact, many retaliation statutes contain vague language about
their scope of protection, and the Court has broadly interpreted these
statutes to allow a wide range of individuals to bring retaliation
claims, including: third parties who report statutory violations,391 atwill employees,392 elected union officials against their union,393 and
illegal aliens.394 In each instance, the Court’s holding demonstrated its
understanding that the enforcement of these laws depended on the
granting of antiretaliation protections to a broad range of individuals.
It is not a far leap from protecting individuals who might report
misconduct to protecting the relatives and friends of those who report.
Indeed, courts seem to understand that an effective way to chill
reporting would be for employers to retaliate against people close to

to be displayed in workplaces. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIVISION, FAIR LABOR
STANDARDS ACT MINIMUM WAGE POSTER (2009), available at http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs
/compliance/posters/minwage.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR DIVISION,
http://www.dol.gov/whd/contact_us.htm (last visited Oct. 11, 2010).
388 See supra text accompanying notes 41–46.
389 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (“[A] primary purpose of [Title
VII’s] antiretaliation provisions[ is] [m]aintaining unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms.”).
390 Id.
391 See Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 237 (1969) (holding that a white
property owner had standing to file a 42 U.S.C. § 1982 claim after a homeowners’ association
had retaliated against him for leasing his house to a black man).
392 See Haddle v. Garrison, 525 U.S. 121, 125–27 (1998) (holding that an at-will employee
may file a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(2) if the employee is fired to deter him
from testifying at an upcoming federal criminal trial).
393 See Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. 347, 355 (1989) (holding that
the removal of a local union’s elected business agent, by a representative of the international
union, in retaliation for the local agent’s speech, violated Title I of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959).
394 See Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 895–96 (1984) (holding that an employer’s
reporting of an illegal alien employee to the INS, in direct retaliation for that employee joining a
labor union, constitutes unlawful employer conduct under the National Labor Relations Act).
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those reporting. As noted by the Seventh Circuit—and often repeated
by others395—“To retaliate against a man by hurting a member of his
family is an ancient method of revenge, and is not unknown in the
field of labor relations.”396 Even courts that ultimately dismiss thirdparty claims based on Title VII’s “plain language” have accepted this
reality. For example, after rejecting a third-party ADEA claim, the
Third Circuit noted:
The anti-retaliation provisions recognize that enforcement of
anti-discrimination laws depends in large part on employees
to initiate administrative and judicial proceedings. There can
be no doubt that an employer who retaliates against the
friends and relatives of employees who initiate antidiscrimination proceedings will deter employees from
exercising their protected rights. . . . Allowing employers to
retaliate via friends and family, therefore, would appear to be
in significant tension with the overall purpose of the antiretaliation provisions, which are intended to promote the
reporting, investigation, and correction of discriminatory
conduct in the workplace.397
Protecting third-party victims of retaliation would follow easily
from the Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, particularly as the Court
applied the Principle in Burlington Northern and in Robinson. The
Supreme Court already recognized in Burlington Northern that
retaliation can take many forms, and thus the law should prohibit a
wide range of retaliatory activity.398 Moreover, Robinson recognized

395 See, e.g., Fogleman v. Mercy Hosp., Inc., 283 F.3d 561, 568–69 (3d Cir. 2002) (“There
can be no doubt that an employer who retaliates against the friends and relatives of employees
who initiate anti-discrimination proceedings will deter employees from exercising their
protected rights.”); Kenrich Petrochemicals, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 400, 410–11 (3d Cir. 1990)
(ordering the reinstatement and backpay of an employee who had been fired because of her
relatives’ participation in a successful union organizing campaign). See generally Alex B. Long,
The Troublemaker’s Friend: Retaliation Against Third Parties and the Right of Association in
the Workplace, 59 FLA. L. REV. 931 (2007) (analyzing third party retaliation claims in the
context of an employee’s right to associate with coworkers).
396 NLRB v. Advertisers Mfg. Co., 823 F.2d 1086, 1088 (7th Cir. 1987).
397 Fogleman, 283 F.3d at 568–69. But see Smith v. Riceland Foods, Inc., 151 F.3d 813,
819 (8th Cir. 1998) (finding a broad interpretation of Title VII’s antiretaliation provision, which
would cover third parties who had not personally engaged in protected activity, is neither
supported by Title VII’s plain language nor necessary to protect third parties, such as spouses,
from retaliation).
398 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006) (concluding that
Title VII’s antiretaliation provision covers any employer action that would be materially adverse
to a reasonable employee or job applicant).
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that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision must protect people other
than “employees” in order to be effective.399
Kasten and Thompson will give the Court further opportunities to
apply the Antiretaliation Principle and to enhance employee lawenforcement efforts. Moreover, the Supreme Court’s decisions in
these cases could have broad implications because several federal
laws contain antiretaliation provisions with similar language to the
FLSA and Title VII.400 If the Supreme Court continues its historic and
recent reliance on the Antiretaliation Principle, then it should reverse
the lower courts’ limited views of retaliation protection because their
decisions weaken law-enforcement efforts.
B. Lower Courts
The Antiretaliation Principle can serve a second important role,
directed at lower courts. The Principle’s emphasis on law
399 Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997) (finding that an interpretation of
Title VII that does not recognize former employees as “employees” would undermine the
purpose behind the act’s antiretaliation provisions by barring an entire subset of actions allowed
under Title VII, such as discriminatory termination).
400 For statutes with language similar to the FLSA language at issue in Kasten, see Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 § 701, 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(4) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against
a federal employee “because the employee has filed a complaint, affidavit, or petition, or has
given any information under this chapter”); Foreign Service Act of 1980 § 1015(a)(4), 22
U.S.C. § 4115(a)(4) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination or punishment of an employee “because
the employee has filed a complaint or petition, or has given any information, affidavit, or
testimony under this subchapter”); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 § 11(c)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006) (prohibiting the discharge of an employee “because such employee
has filed any complaint”); Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act § 505(a),
29 U.S.C. § 1855(a) (2006) (prohibiting coercion or discrimination against “any migrant or
seasonal agricultural worker because such worker has, with just cause, filed any complaint”);
Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 § 3(4)(A), 29 U.S.C. § 2002(4)(A) (2006)
(prohibiting retaliation against an employee because that employee has filed any complaint);
Workforce Investment Act of 1998 § 184(f), 29 U.S.C. § 2934(f) (2006) (requiring the Secretary
of Labor to take action or order “corrective measures” if an employee subject to protection
under this chapter is discharged “because such individual has filed any complaint”); Railway
Labor Act 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(3) (Supp. II 2009) (prohibiting railroad carriers from retaliating
against an employee if that retaliation is due “in whole or in part, to the employee’s lawful, good
faith act done, or perceived by the employer to have been done or about to be done . . . to file a
complaint”); Surface Transportation Assistance Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105(a)(1)(A)(i) (Supp. I
2009) (prohibiting retaliation against a commercial motor vehicle employee if “the employee, or
another person at the employee’s request, has filed a complaint . . . related to a violation of
commercial motor vehicle safety”). For statutes with language similar to the Title VII language
at issue in Thompson, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(d) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against “any individual . . . because such
individual . . . has opposed any practice made unlawful by this section”); Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 § 510, 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an
employee “for exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of an employee
benefit plan” or for testifying against the employer in a proceeding); Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503(b), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(b) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against
an individual for “his or her having exercised or enjoyed . . . any right granted or protected by
this chapter”).

2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM

440

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:2

enforcement provides lower courts the proper perspective from which
to evaluate retaliation cases. Rather than view retaliation cases as a
one-on-one battle of an employee versus an employer, the Principle
invites and requires consideration of society’s broader interest in law
enforcement. The Principle also explicitly recognizes the role that
employees can play in providing information that enhances the
enforcement of society’s laws.
Thus, when courts examine an employee’s retaliation claim, they
should consider explicitly whether protecting the employee from
retaliation would encourage other employees to come forward with
information about illegal conduct, and whether that information
actually would help law-enforcement efforts. This perspective might
affect several different areas of retaliation law that courts currently
debate when examining statutory antiretaliation provisions as well as
the common law of wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. I
will address two such areas in this Section.
1. Causation
First, in recent years, courts increasingly have scrutinized the level
of causation required for a plaintiff to prove that an employer’s
retaliation was caused by an employee’s protected conduct. The
typical retaliation case requires the plaintiff to prove three primary
elements: (1) that the employee engaged in protected conduct; (2) that
the employee suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) that the
employee’s engagement in a protected activity caused the adverse
employment action.401
As explained below, “but for” causation could be required, or
perhaps some lower standard (such as requiring that protected
conduct be a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in the adverse
employment action).
Because of this “causation ambiguity,” courts have examined and
disagreed about the level of causation required in retaliation cases.402
401 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1133 (describing the three prima facie elements of a
Title VII retaliation claim). Some scholars, however, believe that there are more than three
prima facie elements in an antiretaliation claim. For example, Westman and Modesitt believe
that there are four prima facie elements of a typical antiretaliation claim: (1) that the employee
has engaged in protected activity; (2) that the employer knew that the employee had engaged in
the protected activity; (3) that the employee has suffered an adverse employment action; and (4)
that there is a causal connection between the employee’s protected conduct and the adverse
employment action. WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 119, at 230
402 Compare Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 604 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir.
2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court has recently clarified that unless a federal statute provides
otherwise, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating but-for causation in suits brought
under federal law.”), and Wolf v. Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.3d 1337, 1343 (11th Cir. 2000) (“In
demonstrating causation, the plaintiff must prove that the adverse action would not have been
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Many older antiretaliation provisions express their causation standard
by prohibiting retaliation “because of” various protected conduct.403
Although one reading of this language would suggest that “but for”
causation is required, the Supreme Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy
City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, stated that the
proper standard in a First Amendment retaliation case was whether
the protected conduct was a “motivating” or “substantial” factor in
the employer’s decision to take an adverse employment action404—a
lower standard of proof for the employee than “but for” causation. As
the Court noted, “A borderline or marginal candidate should not have
the employment question resolved against him because of
constitutionally protected conduct.”405
Although Mt. Healthy was a constitutional case, the Supreme
Court has examined causation language in employment statutes as
well. In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,406 a Title VII “mixed motive”
discrimination case, a majority of the Court required the plaintiff to
show that his or her protected status was a motivating factor in the
employer’s adverse decision.407 In other words, the Court interpreted

taken ‘but for’ the assertion of FLSA rights.”), with Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320, 334
(5th Cir. 2010) (using “motivating factor” or “mixed-motive” causation standards in a Title VII
antiretaliation claim), and Gupta v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 212 F.3d 571, 590 (11th Cir. 2000)
(“To establish a causal connection, a plaintiff must show that ‘the decision-maker[s] [were]
aware of the protected conduct,’ and ‘that the protected activity and the adverse action were not
wholly unrelated.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Farley v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197
F.3d 1322, 1337 (11th Cir. 1999))).
403 See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act of 1935 § 8(a)(4), 29 U.S.C. § 58(a)(4) (2006)
(prohibiting retaliation against an employee “because he has filed charges or given testimony
under this subchapter”); Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 § 15(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. § 215(a)(3)
(2006) (prohibiting the discrimination or discharge of an employee “because such employee has
filed any complaint”); Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(d) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee because the employee has opposed
an unlawful action or because the employee participated in an investigation); Civil Rights Act of
1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation “because [an employee]
has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”);
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 § 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (prohibiting
retaliation against an employee because that employee has made a charge, testifies, or assists in
an investigation related to the employer’s unlawful conduct).
404 Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
405 Id. at 286. The Court also held that the employer should have an affirmative defense if
it could show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same
employment decision “in the absence of the protected conduct.” Id. at 287.
406 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
407 A “mixed motive” discrimination case, such as Price Waterhouse, involves an
allegation that an employer took an adverse employment action against an employee because of
both permissible and impermissible considerations. Id. According to Price Waterhouse, an
employer can still prevail on the employee’s Title VII claim it if can prove, by a preponderance
of the evidence, that it would have made the same employment decision had it not taken the
plaintiff’s protected status into account. Id. at 242.
Although Price Waterhouse did not result in a single majority opinion, six justices agreed
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the “because of” language in Title VII to mean “was a motivating
factor in.” After the plaintiff satisfied this “motivating factor” burden,
the burden of persuasion shifted to the defendant to demonstrate that
the employer would have taken the same adverse employment action
even if it had not considered the prohibited factor (such as race or
gender)408—a similar affirmative defense to the one set forth in Mt.
Healthy for First Amendment retaliation cases.409 Satisfying this
burden provided the employer a complete affirmative defense to the
employee’s discrimination claim.410
In the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Congress enshrined this mixedmotive analysis, and its accompanying “motivating factor” causation
standard, in Title VII’s statutory language regarding discrimination.411
Subsequently, Congress lowered even further the employee’s
causation burden in whistleblower antiretaliation provisions by
adopting a “contributing factor” standard,412 indicating a substantial
congressional preference for this lower burden of proof.

that the “motivating” or “substantial” factor standard was the proper standard. Id. at 258
(plurality opinion) (adopting the “motivating” factor standard); id. at 259 (White, J., concurring
in the judgment) (stating that the plaintiff’s burden is “to show that the unlawful motive was a
substantial factor in the adverse employment action”); id. at 276 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
the judgment) (stating that the plaintiff must show by direct evidence that his or her protected
status played a substantial factor in an adverse employment decision); see also Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2347 (2009) (reiterating the “causation” holdings in Price
Waterhouse).
408 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (plurality opinion) (“[T]he defendant may avoid a
finding of liability only by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made
the same decision even if it had not taken the plaintiff’s gender into account.”).
409 Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287 (noting that after the plaintiff satisfies its initial burden by
showing that he or she engaged in constitutionally protected conduct, the burden shifts to the
defendant to show by the preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the same
employment decision absent the plaintiff’s protected conduct).
410 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (holding that the defendant can avoid liability
by proving that it would have made the same decision regardless of the plaintiff’s gender).
411 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (establishing that an unlawful hiring practice has
taken place when “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice”). The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 also adopted the affirmative defense set forth in Price Waterhouse, but only
permitted the defense to relieve the employer of liability for certain damages claims. See id.
§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (providing that where a violation is established under this section and the
employer demonstrates that it would have taken the employment action “in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor,” then the court may award only declaratory relief, injunctive
relief in certain circumstances, and certain costs and attorney’s fees). Congress utilized language
similar to that in Price Waterhouse in a provision prohibiting retaliation against employees who
take leave from employment to serve in the military. See Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994 § 2(a), 38 U.S.C. § 4311(c) (2006) (prohibiting
discrimination against employees where an employee’s leave for military service is a motivating
factor, unless the employer would have made the same decision absent that motivating factor).
412 A whistleblower must prove that his protected conduct was only a “contributing factor”
in the adverse employment action taken against him. See, e.g., Wendell H. Ford Aviation
Investment and Reform Act for the 21st Century (AIR 21) § 519(a), 49 U.S.C.
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The Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, did not resolve the debate
around the meaning of the “because of” language, since it applies
only to Title VII’s discrimination section (not the antiretaliation
provision). Older antiretaliation provisions still utilize the “because
of” language, and lower courts have struggled with the level of
causation required by these older antiretaliation statutes, including
Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the False
Claims Act.413 Some courts, relying on Mt. Healthy or Price
Waterhouse, interpreted the statutes to implicitly adopt the
“motivating factor” standard (and also the complete affirmative
defense for employers set forth in Price Waterhouse).414
Complicating matters further, in a surprising 2009 decision in
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
the “because of” language in the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act (ADEA) required a “but for” standard for its discrimination
claims (the Court did not address retaliation claims explicitly).415
Despite the fact that the ADEA was patterned after Title VII and the
two statutes typically have been interpreted similarly, the Court’s
rationale was that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied the
“motivating factor” language only to Title VII’s discrimination
provision.416 According to the Court, because Congress did not also
amend the ADEA with this language, the more traditional “but for”

§ 42121(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (requiring an employee filing a complaint under this act to
demonstrate that the protected conduct was a “contributing factor” in the employment decision);
Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 § 6(a), 49 U.S.C. § 60129(b)(2)(B)(i) (2006)
(requiring that the plaintiff filing a complaint under this act show that his or her protected
conduct was a “contributing factor” in the employment decision). Other recent statutes have
explicitly adopted the burden of proof standard annunciated in AIR 21. See, e.g., SarbanesOxley Act of 2002 § 803(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C) (2006) (“An action brought under
paragraph (1)(B) shall be governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in [49 U.S.C.
§ 42121(b)].”).
413 See statutes cited supra note 400.
414 See, e.g., Pennington v. City of Huntsville, 261 F.3d 1262, 1269 (11th Cir. 2001)
(assuming the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive scheme applies to Title VII retaliation claims);
Norbeck v. Basin Elec. Power Coop., 215 F.3d 848, 852 (8th Cir. 2000) (“We . . . conclude that
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not change the Mt. Healthy/Price Waterhouse [causation and
burden shifting] analysis applicable to retaliation claims under the [False Claims] Act . . . .”);
Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552–54 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the Price
Waterhouse mixed-motive scheme to a Title VII retaliation claim).
415 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2350–51 (2009) (“A plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence (which may be direct or circumstantial), that age was
the ‘but-for’ cause of the challenged employer decision.”).
416 Id. at 2349 (“Congress has since amended Title VII by explicitly authorizing
discrimination claims in which an improper consideration was ‘a motivating factor’ for an
adverse employment decision. This Court has never held that this burden-shifting framework
applies to ADEA claims. And, we decline to do so now.” (citations omitted)).
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standard should apply to the ADEA’s “because of” language.417 In
other words, the Court seemed to say that a statute’s use of the term
“because of” should be interpreted to mean “but for” causation.418
The Gross opinion seemed to close the door to any argument that
“because of” language could mean “motivating factor,” rather than
the “but for” standard for retaliation claims under Title VII, the
ADEA, and other older statutes.419 Indeed, some circuit courts have
interpreted Gross to apply “but for” causation to any federal statute
that does not explicitly utilize some other standard.420
In March 2010, however, the Fifth Circuit issued an unexpected
opinion in Smith v. Xerox Corp.,421 finding that Title VII’s retaliation
provision, coupled with the accompanying “motivating factor”
language from Price Waterhouse, permitted a mixed-motive theory.422
The employer in Smith argued that Gross’s reasoning should apply to
Title VII retaliation cases because the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did
not amend the Title VII antiretaliation provision to include the
“motivating factor” language.423 Therefore, according to the
417 Id. (“Congress neglected to add [a motivating-factor] provision to the ADEA when it
amended Title VII . . . even though it contemporaneously amended the ADEA in several
ways.”).
418 Id. at 2350–51 (holding that a plaintiff seeking relief under the ADEA must show that
they would not have been fired but for their age).
419 See statutes cited supra note 400.
420 See, e.g., Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010)
(“Gross makes clear that in the absence of any additional text bringing mixed-motive claims
within the reach of the statute, the statute’s ‘because of’ language demands proof that a
forbidden consideration . . . was a ‘but for’ cause of the adverse action complained of.”); Fairley
v. Andrews, 578 F.3d 518, 525–26 (7th Cir. 2009) (“[Gross] holds that, unless a statute (such as
the Civil Rights Act of 1991) provides otherwise, demonstrating but-for causation is part of the
plaintiff’s burden in all suits under federal law.”); see also Warshaw v. Concentra Health Servs.,
719 F. Supp. 2d 484, 502–03 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (applying a “but-for” causation standard to an
ADA retaliation claim and holding that Gross prohibits the use of a “mixed motive” standard for
future ADA retaliation claims).
In light of Gross, the lower courts appear to be reconsidering precedent that automatically
applied Title VII’s burden-shifting schemes to other employment statutes by closely examining
the language of various statutes to determine causation. Compare Hunter v. Valley View Local
Schs., 579 F.3d 688, 691–92 (6th Cir. 2009) (finding that the FMLA permitted a “mixedmotive” analysis based on the statute’s use of the term “interfere with” and the Department of
Labor’s interpretation of that term), with Rasic v. City of Northlake, No. 08-C-104, 2009 WL
3150428, at *17–18 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 25, 2009) (suggesting that the FMLA’s use of “for
opposing” is not distinguishable from the ADEA’s use of “because of,” and, as a result, the
FMLA probably mandates a “but for” causation standard).
421 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010).
422 Id. at 330 (“Because we believe that Gross does not unequivocally control whether a
mixed-motive jury instruction may be given in a Title VII retaliation case, we must continue to
allow the Price Waterhouse burden shifting in such cases unless and until the Supreme Court
says otherwise.”).
423 Id. at 328 (“[The employer] urged . . . [that] a Title VII retaliation plaintiff, like an
ADEA discrimination plaintiff, may not obtain a motivating factor jury instruction and must
instead prove that retaliation was the but-for cause for the adverse employment action.”).
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employer, Congress must have meant to keep the “but for” standard
implied by the provision’s “because of” language.424 The court
maintained, however, that Gross required courts to interpret Title VII
and the ADEA differently, and that Price Waterhouse should still
apply to Title VII retaliation cases.425 Because of Price Waterhouse’s
application, the court concluded that a Title VII retaliation plaintiff
could satisfy its burden of proof by demonstrating that the plaintiff’s
protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in an adverse
employment action.426
To the extent that Gross can be limited in this manner—to apply
only to age-discrimination claims—lower courts should utilize the
Antiretaliation Principle to interpret retaliation statutes under the
“motivating factor” standard. Retaliation cases almost always involve
difficult decisions regarding mixed motives and retaliation, and a “but
for” causation standard would be devastating to employees who blow
the whistle on illegal conduct.
Whistleblowers often are outspoken employees—in large part that
is what makes them whistleblowers—and, as a result, their employers
can perceive them as troublemakers. Accordingly, requiring that an
employee prove that protected conduct is the only factor in a
disciplinary action will be enormously difficult. Even under statutes
that require only a “motivating factor” standard (or the lower
“contributing factor” standard), some empirical evidence
demonstrates that causation is notoriously difficult to prove.427 If
lower courts take the Court’s Antiretaliation Principle seriously, then
424 Id.
425 Id. at 330 (noting that Price Waterhouse still controlled Title VII antiretaliation-claim
analysis because of the Supreme Court’s recognition in Gross that “Title VII and the ADEA are
‘materially different with respect to the relevant burden of persuasion’ (quoting Gross v. FBL
Fin. Servs., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2348 (2009))).
426 See id. at 326–30. The Fifth Circuit also overruled its own precedent to find that a Title
VII plaintiff could satisfy the motivating-factor burden with either direct or circumstantial
evidence. See id. at 331–32 (“The specific text of the Title VII retaliation provision, § 2000e3(a), prohibits an employer from discriminating ‘because’ the employee has, inter alia, made a
charge against the employer. The statute provides no indication of the type of evidentiary
showing necessary to prove the retaliation claim. Because the text of § 2000e-3(a) neither
requires nor prohibits a specific evidentiary showing, construing it to include the mixed-motive
framework to be shown by circumstantial evidence does no violence to the statute. Title VII
does not affirmatively require direct evidence from a plaintiff, whether in a discrimination or
retaliation context, and we can see no basis for requiring a heightened evidentiary showing in
order to obtain a motivating factor jury instruction predicated only on the theory of liability
alleged in the complaint (discrimination versus retaliation).” (footnotes omitted)). But see
Fierros v. Tex. Dep’t of Health, 274 F.3d 187, 192 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that direct evidence
was required for a mixed-motive retaliation case to shift the burden to the defendant).
427 See Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why
Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 65, 120–28 (2007)
(analyzing the success rates of employees bringing Sarbanes-Oxley retaliation claims when
courts address issues of causation).
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they will look for ways to distinguish Gross and continue to apply the
“motivating factor” language from the Court’s Price Waterhouse
decision in retaliation cases.
2. Reasonable Belief
The Antiretaliation Principle also could influence lower courts
when they determine whether a whistleblower had a “reasonable
belief” that the reported employer conduct was actually illegal. The
issue revolves around the “protected conduct” element of most
retaliation and wrongful-discharge claims. This element requires the
employee to have engaged in specifically protected conduct, which
often involves reporting or opposing “any practice made unlawful” by
the statute containing the antiretaliation provision.428 Courts could
interpret this language to mean that the employee must report actual
illegal conduct in order to be protected.429 In other words, if the
employer’s actions were legal, the law would not protect an employee
from retaliation for reporting the conduct under the mistaken, but
reasonable, belief that the conduct was actually illegal.430
Additionally, several common-law courts require an employee to
report actual illegalities in order to state a claim for wrongful
discharge in violation of public policy.431
Nevertheless, despite this potentially narrow protected conduct
requirement, other courts have required employees only to
428 See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 § 4(d), 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee who has “opposed any practice made
unlawful by this section”); Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 § 105(a)(2), 29 U.S.C.
§ 2615(a)(2) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation “against any individual for opposing any practice
made unlawful by this subchapter”); Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 704(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)
(2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made
an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter”); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
§ 503(a), 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) (2006) (prohibiting retaliation against an individual who “has
opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this chapter”).
429 See WESTMAN & MODESITT, supra note 119, at 82 (noting that both the Minnesota
Supreme Court and the State of New York Court of Appeals have required whistleblowers to
prove that their employers actually violated either state or federal law).
430 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1140–41 (arguing that in Breeden, “the [Supreme]
Court’s language suggested that perhaps it would require an actual violation” for the employee’s
actions to constitute “protected activity” for a Title VII antiretaliation claim). Compare Byers v.
Dallas Morning News, Inc., 209 F.3d 419, 428 (5th Cir. 2000) (stating that an employee had
engaged in protected conduct under Title VII so long as he had a reasonable belief that his
employer had engaged in unlawful conduct), with EEOC v. C & D Sportswear Corp., 398 F.
Supp. 300, 306 (M.D. Ga. 1975) (holding that in order for an employee to have engaged in
“protected activity” under Title VII, the employer must have actually committed an unlawful
employment practice).
431 See, e.g., Barker v. State Ins. Fund, 40 P.3d 463, 469–70 (Okla. 2001) (declining to
recognize a state law claim for “public employees who complain about the way an organization
is managed when the complaints merely exhibit differences of opinion or dissatisfaction with
discretionary management decisions and the like”).
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demonstrate a “reasonable belief” that employer conduct is illegal.432
The most well known example of this standard stems from the
Supreme Court’s 2001 decision in Clark County School District v.
Breeden. In that case, the Court assumed (without deciding) that the
reasonable-belief standard applied to Title VII retaliation cases,433 a
decision that paved the way for courts uniformly to adopt the
reasonable-belief standard for a broad range of statutes.434 This
requirement involves both a subjective and an objective
component.435 The employee must subjectively believe the conduct is
illegal, and the employee’s belief must be objectively reasonable. The
employee could be wrong about the legality of the employer’s
actions, but as long as the employee’s belief was reasonable, the law
would still protect the employee from retaliation. Recently passed
federal laws specifically require the employee to have a “reasonable
belief” that the employer action the employee reports or opposes is
illegal.436
The reasonable-belief standard seems to comport with the
Antiretaliation Principle, particularly when compared with the fact
that courts could interpret some statutory language to protect only
reports of actual violations.437 Despite this seemingly employee432 See Brake, supra note 7, at 76–77 (discussing how and why courts do not require
plaintiffs to prove that their employers actually engaged in unlawful conduct).
433 Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001).
434 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1129 n.7 (“Although the [Breeden] Court specifically
declined to answer the question regarding what an opposition-clause plaintiff must prove with
respect to this issue, since Breeden, courts within all United States circuits have adopted the
objectively reasonable standard.”). Courts also use the reasonable-belief standard for other
statutes that do not specify the standard to be utilized, such as Title VI and Title IX. See Brake,
supra note 7, at 83 n.223 (collecting cases).
435 See Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1134 (“[C]ourts evaluate whether the employee had a
subjective, good-faith belief that the activity was unlawful, and whether that belief was
objectively reasonable.”).
436 See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006)
(providing antiretaliation protection to employees who reasonably believe that their employer
has engaged in unlawful conduct).
437 Some commentators have reviewed this landscape and suggested that an even more
lenient standard might better encourage employees to come forward with information of
potential wrongdoing. For example, Professor Lawrence Rosenthal argues that a “good faith”
standard would comport with an appropriately broad reading of Title VII’s antiretaliation
provision to encourage employees to report violations of the statute. See Rosenthal, supra note
67, at 1130–31 (arguing that Title VII’s antiretaliation provision should protect employees who
report on an employer in subjective good faith, even if the employee is wrong or the employee’s
belief is unreasonable). In the case of Title VII, at least, Professor Rosenthal acknowledges that
courts likely would reject a purely subjective good-faith standard given the statutory language
and courts’ interpretation of the language after Breeden, as well as EEOC interpretations that
support a “reasonable belief” requirement. Id.; see also Brake, supra note 7, at 81 n.215
(arguing that the Court’s decision in Breeden “forecloses a more lenient standard requiring only
a subjective good faith belief”). More broadly, the statutory language of more recently enacted
antiretaliation provisions explicitly utilizes the “reasonable belief” standard, which would seem
to preclude courts from using the good-faith standard. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
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friendly standard, however, lower courts often have applied the
reasonable-belief requirement to narrow, rather than broaden,
retaliation protection.438 In many cases, lower courts have turned
Breeden’s “reasonable belief” standard into an implicit requirement
that an employee report actual violations of the law.439 These courts
have required employees to know the subtle intricacies of the
substantive law allegedly being violated by their employer in order to
conclude that an employee had a reasonable belief that an illegality
occurred.440 For example, in Jordan v. Alternative Resources Corp.,441
the Fourth Circuit held that an employee who reported a coemployee’s use of a racial slur was not protected from retaliation,
because no employee could have reasonably thought that a one-time

§ 806(a), 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006) (granting antiretaliation protection to employees of
publicly traded companies who report against their employers with a reasonable belief that the
employer’s conduct is illegal); American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No.
111-5, § 1553(a), 123 Stat. 115, 297 (to be codified in 26 U.S.C.) (utilizing the reasonable-belief
standard to protect whistleblowing employees in state and local governments).
438 See Brake, supra note 7, at 76 (“One of the most problematic limits [imposed by courts]
is the requirement that the challenger have a reasonable belief that the challenged conduct
amounts to unlawful discrimination. Through this doctrine, courts have reinforced selective and
narrow interpretations of discrimination, while labeling broader conceptions as unreasonable.”);
Brianne J. Gorod, Rejecting “Reasonableness”: A New Look at Title VII’s Anti-Retaliation
Provision, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1469, 1472–73 (2007) (arguing that courts often apply the
reasonableness standard so narrowly that it deprives complaining employees of antiretaliation
protections).
439 See Moberly, supra note 131, at 1003 & n.161 (arguing that many courts have applied
the “reasonable belief” standard so as to require employees to prove that their employers have
violated the law); Rosenthal, supra note 67, at 1162–63 (“[M]any courts . . . do not seem to be
taking into account the ‘limited knowledge’ most Title VII plaintiffs have about the contours of
Title VII, and the courts have consistently ruled against employees after concluding that their
belief of a Title VII violation was not objectively reasonable.”).
440 See, e.g., George v. Leavitt, 407 F.3d 405, 416–17 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (holding that the
reasonableness of a report of illegality should be judged by whether a reasonable jury could find
the conduct illegal); Peters v. Jenney, 327 F.3d 307, 320 (4th Cir. 2003) (remanding a Title VI
retaliation claim to the district court so that the plaintiff could further develop the record to
show that she had a reasonable belief that her employer had engaged in intentional
discrimination); Hamner v. St. Vincent Hosp. & Health Care Ctr., Inc., 224 F.3d 701, 708 (7th
Cir. 2000) (“In conclusion, Hamner’s retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because the
conduct that he opposed (harassment because of his sexual orientation) is not, under any
circumstances, proscribed by Title VII, and thus he has failed to provide sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to conclude that he opposed (or reasonably believed that he was opposing) an
unlawful employment practice under Title VII.”); Little v. United Techs., Carrier Transicold
Div., 103 F.3d 956, 960 (11th Cir. 1997) (denying the plaintiff’s Title VII antiretaliation claim
because the plaintiff could not reasonably believe that a single racially offensive remark was
unlawful conduct); Holmes v. Long Island R.R. Co., No. 96 V 6196 (NG), 2001 WL 797951, at
*6 (E.D.N.Y. June 4, 2001) (dismissing the plaintiff’s Title VII retaliation claim because the
plaintiff could not have reasonably believed that isolated and minor instances of offensive
conduct violated Title VII); see also Brake, supra note 7, at 86–98 (discussing how courts apply
the “reasonable belief” standard to reinforce narrow constructions of unlawful or discriminatory
behavior).
441 458 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2006).

2/14/2011 5:56:37 PM

2011]

THE SUPREME COURT’S ANTIRETALIATION PRINCIPLE

449

use of a racial epitaph violated Title VII.442 The Jordan court,
however, seemed more intent on examining whether the incident
could have amounted to unlawful harassment rather than on whether
the employee could have reasonably believed that the conduct was
unlawful.443
The Antiretaliation Principle could affect courts’ thinking about
how to interpret the reasonable-belief standard so as to more fully
incorporate the Principle’s law-enforcement goals. The Jordan
court’s narrow construction underestimates the chilling effect of
retaliation and fails to consider that employees typically do not have
legal expertise. Broader construction of the “protected activity”
requirement might better support society’s interest in law
enforcement. This law-enforcement interest will be better served
because employees—lay persons with no legal background or
expertise—will feel more free to report an employer’s questionable
conduct. Society would be better off with knowledgeable
decisionmakers determining whether the disclosed, questionable
conduct violates the law after an employee’s report, instead of lay
employees trying to determine legality before they report. This
broader protection should cause a court to be less interested in
whether the employee’s report precisely identified an explicit
violation of law, and more interested in the employer’s response to
that report.
Moreover, other Supreme Court retaliation precedent supports a
more nuanced view of an employee’s background when considering
whether the employee objectively acted reasonably. In Burlington
Northern, the Court examined what type of employer action might be
deemed sufficiently adverse to constitute “retaliation” under Title
VII.444 As noted above, the Court concluded that retaliation occurred
if the employer’s action “could well dissuade a reasonable worker
from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.”445 Later in the
opinion, the Court stated that when courts consider the “reasonable
employee,” they should take into account the specific employee’s
442 Id. at 339 (stating that an unlawful employment practice under Title VII requires a
workplace “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment” (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787–88
(1998) (noting that one incident typically cannot create a hostile work environment that is
actionable under Title VII, unless the incident is sufficiently severe).
443 Jordan, 458 F.3d at 341–43 (discussing whether the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint
could support a finding that his employer engaged in unlawful conduct).
444 Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 57 (2006).
445 Id.
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individual circumstances. “[T]he significance of any given act of
retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances.
Context matters.”446
In the same way, lower courts could fix the problems caused by
narrow interpretations of the “reasonable belief” standard by
explicating what the law expects from an employee when reporting
misconduct. Retaliation law should protect only “reasonable” reports,
but that standard should consider the education level and expertise of
the employee making the report, as well as the employee’s own
employment experiences with the employer.447 In-house counsel may
be expected to know the intricate details of sexual-harassment law,
but perhaps a worker with a high-school education should not.448
Accountants may be expected to understand whether the securities
regulations have been violated, but should be given leeway when a
law’s language can lead to different reasonable interpretations.449
446 Id. at 69. As Professor Deborah Brake has pointed out, the Ninth Circuit in Breeden
adopted a similarly nuanced standard that the Supreme Court ignored:
[T]he Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Breeden exhibited a more appropriate
measure of caution, emphasizing the need to take into account “‘the limited
knowledge possessed by most Title VII plaintiffs about the factual and legal bases of
their claims.’” The Ninth Circuit evaluated reasonableness from the perspective of a
Title VII plaintiff. The Supreme Court’s cursory discussion of reasonableness
clouded the question of perspective and implicitly adopted the Court’s own
perspective, shaped by the limits of existing case law.
Brake, supra note 7, at 82–83 (footnotes omitted).
447 See Reed v. A.W. Lawrence & Co., Inc., 95 F.3d 1170, 1179 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he
subjective sensibilities of an alleged victim may be a relevant consideration in determining
whether conduct by a supervisor or a coworker is legally sanctionable.”); cf. Brake, supra note
7, at 103 (“[Courts should] ask whether the plaintiff can make a reasoned case that the practices
opposed interfere with the goals and objectives of discrimination law. . . . The perspective from
which reasonableness is measured should not be that of the judge reading and selecting the
dominant legal precedents, but the reasonable employee, student, or person in the organization
who wishes to further the goals of discrimination law: dismantling unjust privilege and
promoting the conditions necessary for equal citizenship.”).
448 Compare Henderson v. Waffle House, Inc., 238 Fed. App’x 499, 503 (11th Cir. 2007)
(per curiam) (holding that a waitress could not have had an objectively reasonable belief that her
manager’s isolated jokes and comments about her breasts had violated Title VII), with Nuskey
v. Hochberg, 657 F. Supp. 2d 47, 61 (D.D.C. 2009) (“If plaintiff relied on an EEO training to
conclude that Title VII had been violated, her belief was in good faith and was not
unreasonable—even if her conclusion ultimately proved to be incorrect.”).
449 Cf. Allen v. Stewart Enterp., Inc., ARB No. 06-081, at 14 (July 27, 2006), available at
http://www.oalj.dol.gov/public/arb/decisions/arb_decisions/sox/06_081.soxp.pdf (holding that a
lay-employee could not have had a “reasonable belief” that her employer had violated the SEC’s
regulations concerning “internal consolidated financial statements” because she had “testified
that she was not aware of any SEC rule or regulation requiring that these internal documents be
filed with the SEC or comply with SEC rules and regulations”). In Allen, the employee alleged
that she examined “internal consolidated financial statements” and that these statements
indicated that the company violated an SEC rule. Id. The Administrative Review Board (ARB),
however, found that her disclosure of this potential SEC rule violation was not protected
because these internal reports did not have to be filed with the SEC, and, therefore, the employer
could not have violated SEC regulations. Id. Based on this nuance, the ARB found that the
employee could not have “reasonably believed” that a violation of the rule occurred. Id.; see
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Lower courts can best support the Antiretaliation Principle by
recognizing that employees typically are not lawyers and therefore
should not be required to evaluate numerous legal nuances before
reporting misconduct. Law-enforcement experts and supervisors
should be charged with determining whether the law is being violated,
not employees. The law should simply encourage employees to come
forward with information that a reasonable person with their
knowledge and educational experience would believe to be a violation
of the law. The easiest way to encourage that process is to protect a
broad range of activity and then closely evaluate the employer’s
response. In other words, the Antiretaliation Principle best protects
society’s interest when the scrutiny in retaliation cases is directed
towards the employer’s response to whistleblowing, rather than the
employee’s actions when blowing the whistle. Lower courts would
help achieve this result by loosening the “reasonable belief” standard
to permit the protection of more reports of potentially illegal conduct.
CONCLUSION
In Supreme Court retaliation cases, despite the Court’s employerfriendly outlook and conservative judicial philosophy, it has protected
employees who act to enforce society’s laws. The lesson from the
Court’s use of the Antiretaliation Principle over the last fifty years
and, in particular, during the last five years, is that the Court rightly
values retaliation protection. Protecting employees from retaliation
when they disclose an employer’s illegal behavior advances society’s
goal of strong law enforcement. The Supreme Court and lower courts
should work to further the Antiretaliation Principle by strengthening
the protections available to whistleblowers who report illegal
corporate behavior.
Although this Article has detailed the ways in which the
Antiretaliation Principle can aid courts in retaliation cases, Congress
could learn from the Principle as well. In a subsequent article, I will
detail how Congress can better utilize employees for law-enforcement
purposes. For example, at a minimum, Congress could update older
statutes to explicitly provide employees strong antiretaliation
protection, which would relieve the Supreme Court of having to

also Jason M. Zuckerman, SOX’s Whistleblower Provision—Promise Unfulfilled, SEC. LITIG.
REP., July/Aug. 2007, at 14, 16–17 (discussing the ARB’s interpretation of the “reasonable
belief” standard); cf. Gorod, supra note 438, at 1484–96 (criticizing the “reasonable belief”
standard because courts may use it to improperly reject Title VII retaliation claims by lay
employees who are unaware of the law and its nuances).
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perform jurisprudential gymnastics to satisfy the Antiretaliation
Principle.450 Furthermore, the Court’s Antiretaliation Principle
teaches that Congress and its statutes are better at protecting
employees from retaliation than the First Amendment. Accordingly,
Congress could encourage the reporting of illegal conduct in the
government by improving the statutory whistleblower protections for
federal employees.
In fact, identifying the Supreme Court’s use of the Antiretaliation
Principle helps focus attention on the fact that the Court itself often
answers questions that might be answered best by Congress: Which
laws should be enforced by relying, at least in part, on employee
disclosures? Which employees should be protected from retaliation if
they disclose illegalities? To whom should employees be required to
disclose misconduct in order to be protected? What type of retaliation
should be prohibited? In its recent retaliation cases, the Supreme
Court had to answer these questions because Congress did not.
Democratic norms suggest that the legislature as well as the courts
should broadly implement the Antiretaliation Principle and balance
employer and employee interests with society’s interest in law
enforcement. Until Congress addresses these questions more
consistently, however, it appears that the Supreme Court is willing to
step into the breach to protect employees who report illegal conduct.

450 See discussion supra Part II.C (discussing the difficulties of finding implied retaliation
protection in Title IX, § 1981, and the federal sector provision of the ADEA).

